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ABSTRACT 
 The 1998 Credit Union Membership Access Act resulted in the active dissolution of the 
common bond requirement. Now credit unions are able to include more geographic area into their 
member base. However, over the years the total number of credit unions have been reduced, but 
the average size of total assets escalated severely along with the increase in total number of 
members. Amid the economic recession in 2002 and the financial crisis during 2008-2009, credit 
unions had to struggle in minimizing costs of operation to stay competitive with the commercial 
finance institutions.  
 In this study, X-efficiency scores (with and without off-balance sheet items) of each of the 
credit unions from 1994 through 2012 were calculated by dividing data into four periods of 
importance to analysis each period individually. A Tobit regression was run to understand the 
variations in performances by each group of credit unions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 To my parents, who always inspired me to go for higher education. You were always there 
to share the responsibilities with me while I had to trade-off the opportunities of education with 
the income prospects for my family.  
 To my lovely wife, Shamima Siddiqua, who carried out my duties on her shoulder when I 
came abroad for this degree. To my sprightly son, Aritrya Shihor. At the end of a busy day, I 
always found stimulus by looking at your pictures. 
 My deepest gratitude is to Dr. McKee. It was never possible to complete this degree without 
your insightful opinion, guidance and motivation. You prepared me to take the drive towards next 
level of my education.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………………...iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS …………………………………………………………………….....iv 
LIST OF TABLES ………………………………………………………………………………vii 
LIST OF FIGURES …………………………………………..………………………………...viii 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………….……………...1 
1.1. What is a credit union? …………………...………………………………………….1 
1.2. US credit unions from 1994 to 2012 …………………………………………………2 
1.3. Credit unions regulations …………………………………….………...…………….3  
1.4. Credit union management ……………………………………………...………….…3 
1.5. Efficiency measure of credit unions ………………………………………...……….4 
1.6. Off-balance sheet activities ………………………………………………..….……...5 
1.7. Influence of macroeconomic variables ……………………………………………....6 
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW…………………………………………………………7 
 2.1. Credit union industry ………………………………………………………………...7 
 2.2. Managing credit unions ……………………………………………………………...8 
 2.3. X-efficiency ………………………………………………………………...………..8  
 2.4. Deregulation ……………………………………………………………………...…10 
 2.5. Off-balance sheet activities ………………………………………………………....12 
 2.6. Influence of macroeconomic variables …………………………………………......13 
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY………………………………………………..……………..14  
 3.1. Theoretical framework………………………………………….……………….......14 
  3.1.1. Approaches to X-efficiency calculation……………..……………….……14 
  3.1.2. Production possibility sets......………………………………………….…14  
  3.1.3. Theory of cost minimization……………………………………...….……16 
vi 
 
  3.1.4. Cost function………………………………………………...…………….17 
 3.2. Empirical framework………………………………………………...…………...…18  
  3.2.1. Evolution of data envelopment analysis (DEA)…………………………..18  
  3.2.2. Input-oriented measures of technical and X-efficiency………………...…18  
  3.2.3. Return to scale assumption…………………………………………...…...21  
  3.2.4. Efficiency calculation by linear programming formulation………..……..22  
  3.2.5. Technical efficiency under CRS…………………...…………...…………22  
  3.2.6. Technical efficiency under VRS……………………………………......…23  
  3.2.7. X-efficiency (XE)……………………………………………………..…..23  
  3.2.8. Test for efficiency comparison…………………………...……………….24 
3.3. Explaining differences in efficiency scores…………………………………............25  
  3.3.1. Tobit model………………………………………………………..............25 
 3.4. Data and variables………………………………………………………………...…25 
 3.5. Summary statistics………………………………………………………...………...28 
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION...………………………………………...31 
 4.1. First stage: data envelopment analysis (DEA)………………………………..……..31 
 4.2. Explaining the differences in efficiency scores………………………….…..…..….40 
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS.…….………………………………………………………….56 
REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………………..59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table                 Page 
3.1: Input and output variables under intermediation approach……………………………..…..28 
3.2: Input and output variables (average) of non-metro credit unions (in million dollars)……...29 
3.3: Input and output variables (average) of metro credit unions (in million dollars)…………...30 
4.1: Efficiency scores of non-metro credit unions……………………...…………………….….32 
4.2: Test of differences in X-efficiency scores without OBS activities and with OBS  
        activities (non-metro credit unions)……………………………………...…………….…...35 
 
4.3: Efficiency scores of metro credit unions………………...………………….........................37 
4.4: Test of differences in X-efficiency scores without OBS activities and with OBS  
        activities (metro credit unions)……………………………………...……………………...38 
 
4.5: Tobit regression for XE scores of 1st quartile of non-metro credit unions…………………42 
4.6: Tobit regression for XE scores of 2nd quartile of non-metro credit unions………………...43 
4.7: Tobit regression for XE scores of 3rd quartile of non-metro credit unions…………………44 
4.8: Tobit regression for XE scores of 4th quartile of non-metro credit unions…………………45 
4.9: Tobit regression for XE scores of 1st quartile of metro credit unions………………………46 
4.10: Tobit regression for XE scores of 2nd quartile of metro credit unions…............................47 
4.11: Tobit regression for XE scores of 3rd quartile of metro credit unions….............................48  
4.12: Tobit regression for XE scores of 4th quartile of metro credit unions…….........................49  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure                   Page 
3.1: Input space representation……………………………………………………………...…...16 
3.2: Minimization of costs…………………………………………………………………….....17 
3.3: Input-oriented measure of technical and X-efficiency…………...…...……………….........19  
3.4: Returns to scale assumption in DEA………………………………………………………..22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. What is a credit union? 
 Credit unions (CU) are cooperative financial institutions. Their members provide inputs in 
the form of savings and use the outputs in the form of loans. Providers of inputs (savers) in a credit 
union are also the users of outputs (borrowers). By law, credit unions are cooperative enterprises 
controlled by their members-under the principle of “one-person one-vote.”  Credit union 
membership is open to all within an accepted common bond restriction or community designation. 
Members enjoy economic benefit on the basis of their usage. Members can attain economic 
benefits including a higher interest rate on deposits and lower rates on loans. These benefits are 
part of a process of the credit union to channel excess proceeds to members. When a member wants 
to optimize gains as a borrower and a lender simultaneously, credit unions must reduce loan 
charges while increasing share account rates, implying that the costs of operating should be kept 
to a minimum. Credit unions that do not minimize operating costs will have problems competing 
with other financial institutions.  
 Relationship-directed finance is the principal notion of the credit union. Interaction 
between credit union members in sharing responsibilities by democratic control and voluntary 
services provide the opportunity to improve in informational efficiencies that help credit unions 
grow and possibly reduce loan losses.  The competitive advantage of information gathering also 
helps credit unions reduce information costs and also helps credit unions manage operating costs. 
The advantage of commercial banks can be the ability to obtain economy of scale due to their asset 
size, but comparatively smaller credit unions can also increase their asset base through their ability 
to attract small deposit holders. However, when banks increase their earnings by increasing non-
interest income, smaller credit unions can appeal more to small depositors. 
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 Credit unions have an income tax exemption based upon cooperative ownership of the 
entity.  Credit unions are able to pass tax benefits to members in terms of lower loan rates, higher 
deposit rates, or by providing a variety of financial products and services. Non-metro communities, 
where community banks may not be present, are markets in which credit unions may provide 
access to financial services.  
1.2. US credit unions from 1994 to 2012 
 Credit unions have been serving members in the U.S. for more than 100 years. During this 
period, the credit union movement became popular gradually as state and federal laws were 
enacted to charter credit unions.  In 1970, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) 
became an independent federal agency. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s deregulation allowed 
credit unions to increase their member base and services; in the 1990s U.S. credit unions continued 
to expand as a group. Deregulation during this period, a milestone in the history of U.S. credit 
unions, helped credit unions to expand geographically across the country as members with more 
than one common bond (or community) were able to join. At the start of 21st century, credit unions 
had to counter two economic shocks – recession in 2002 and financial crisis in 2008-2009.  
  In 1994, there were 12,201 credit unions, which decreased to 6,960 in 2012 – a reduction 
of nearly 43%. In spite of deregulation to make credit unions more competitive with commercial 
banks, this sharp decline in total number invites a critical study of this industry. The total number 
is not the only variable explaining the overall condition of U.S. credit unions. In 1994 credit unions 
had a total assets of over $295 billion dollars, which increased to $1.03 trillion dollars by 2012 – 
an increase of 251% since 1994. Credit unions increased membership from 1994 to 2012 
approximately 44 percent.   
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1.3. Credit unions regulations  
 Traditionally, commercial banks and credit unions have co-existed in a competitive 
relationship. Banks continue to argue against the tax-subsidy of credit unions, while credit unions 
wish to remove regulatory burdens. Changes in the market environment also obligate credit unions 
to offer innovative ranges of products and appeal to new members by expanding to additional 
geographical areas (based on mergers and charter changes).   
 Legislation passed in 1976, 1978 and 1980 enabled credit unions to offer parallel services 
that commercial banks deliver (Black and Dugger, 1981). Legislation afforded credit unions 
authority to provide competitive industry services, but also shifted credit unions further from the 
principles they were established on. The 1998 Credit Union Membership Access Act resulted in 
the practical dissolution of the single common bond requirement, allowing federally chartered 
unions to add select employee groups to their fields of membership. This allowed credit unions to 
expand the geographic of the member base. However, the total number of credit unions has 
declined while average size of total asset escalated significantly over the past two decades. This 
may help explain how changes in regulations have not enabled all credit unions to stay competitive. 
Therefore, there is an opportunity to study the financial performance of credit unions during this 
period (1994-2012) in order to identify activities that may help explain the ability of credit unions 
to exploit the benefit of deregulation. 
1.4. Credit union management  
 The orientation of management structure affects the variations in performance among 
credit unions. Unpredictability in the upper level of management affects the performance of the 
firm across all levels. Decisions made regarding staffing, product mix, or even on the philosophy 
of credit unions, have a direct influence on performance. Since end users of services are also the 
owners of the organization, credit union managers have less motivation to take risks. When 
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managers are not part of the ownership base, questions of agency theory may arise.  With a non-
profit maximizing objective, credit union management choices can influence the cost structure, 
and the members can experience less empowerment concerning the growth of institutions.  As a 
result, management may attain more authority and a principal-agent struggle arise (O’Brien, 1993).   
 If the manager of a credit union has weak motivation to perform in a stakeholders’ best 
interest a principal-agent conflict is likely to happen. Managers may choose cost-preference 
activities that benefit themselves in the form of higher employee compensation and operation costs 
at the expense of members. Evidence confirms that benefits are transferred to management from 
members as more member groups are added to credit unions (Leggett and Strand, 2002). To avoid 
these potential conflicts while turning competitive risks into opportunities requires a well-managed 
credit union. But whether most credit unions are well-managed remains a fundamental question.   
1.5. Efficiency measure of credit unions 
 The ownership structure and membership restrictions of credit unions have traditionally 
limited the ability of cost reduction. Mergers and technological innovation are providing 
opportunities for growth as well as risking the survival of credit unions. But to take advantage of 
opportunities and to ensure survival, credit unions have to be operated efficiently, managed well, 
and provide better member services.    
 The operational structure of credit unions may be compatible with realizing achievements 
in cost efficiency. If paper-based operations and labor-intensive processes can be replaced by using 
information technology, operational costs will be reduced. When members of credit unions get 
services through the Internet, they no longer have to be present physically. This also helps generate 
extra sources of fee earnings for credit unions from added services and products. Cost efficiency 
provides a measure of any credit union’s cost of producing an output bundle relative to a best-
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practicing credit union’s cost of producing similar bundle. The environment credit unions operate 
in accounts for most efficiency differences. In this study, the feature of cost efficiency of particular 
note is X-efficiency, which is directly attributed to managerial ability to control costs (Berger, 
Hunter, and Timme, 1993). 
1.6. Off-balance sheet activities   
 When some credit unions are under pressure to create new products and services, they may 
add more off-balance sheet activities into their portfolio, with the total amount increasing in recent 
years. Off-balance sheet (OBS) items are not revealed in traditional portfolio activity. Fees 
received from the operation of off-balance sheet products are not identified in the balance sheet. 
According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), off-balance sheet activities 
incorporate ranges of items including loan commitments, certain letters of credit, and revolving 
underwriting facilities. Credit union commitments include lines of credit, credit cards, and home 
equity lines. These are products external to the consolidated financial statement that comprise 
features of credit and interest rate risk. Commitments are arrangements to offer credit to any 
member until the expiration date as long as there is no alteration of any condition recognized in 
the contract. Sometimes a fee payment is required to use this service. Researchers argue whether 
off-balance sheet items are risky or not. Some view off-balance sheet items as risky and difficult 
to measure market risk (Angbazo, 1997), while some claim that including off-balance sheet items 
in a portfolio reduces risk (Boot and Thakor, 1991; Hassan, 2005). Off-balance sheet activities are 
additional sources of bank output and sources of additional non-interest income (Pasiouras, 2008), 
and better risk management (Jagtiani, Nathan and Sick; 1995). Since bank inefficiency is related 
to product mix, omission of off-balance sheet items from bank output may produce an understate 
efficiency score (Clark and Siems, 2002). 
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1.7. Influence of macroeconomic variables 
 Similar to other financial intermediaries, credit unions adjust their portfolio to respond to 
changing economic conditions. Expansionary and contractionary monetary policies determine the 
availability of credit and the rate of interest on loans and deposits, which in turn affect GDP 
components such as the consumption of durable goods, non-durable goods, capital goods, housing 
investment, retail sales, and trade. On one hand, the income level of the community, customers’ 
ability to save, the local  unemployment rate, and business opportunities all shape the product mix 
and operation structure of any credit union. On the other hand, the services and products offered 
by credit unions help generate income, create opportunities for employment, and provide members 
with access to credit, which helps the local economy function better. From 1994 to 2012, the U.S. 
credit unions have operated through two economic downturns – a recession in 2002 and a financial 
crisis during 2008-2009. These complications caused by macroeconomic changes make the 
performance of credit unions interesting to observe. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Credit union industry  
 Smith, Cargill and Meyer (1981) stated that the traditional cooperative theory was not 
directly applicable to model credit union performance. The first reason for this is that members are 
both the owners of the organization and the consumers of its output. Traditional cooperatives have 
only one role in the market: to provide benefits to users. The second reason is that credit unions 
provide services to two groups with contradictory demands for benefits. For example, one group, 
savers, wants higher interest rates in order to obtain increased revenue. The other group, borrowers, 
wants lower interest rates in order to decrease expenses. Creating financial benefits for the users 
with opposing objectives in the financial marketplace leads to tension within the firm.  
 A number of authors have studied the role of the common bond in promoting the financial 
performance of credit unions. Black and Dugger (1981) observed that the common bond restriction 
reduced the cost of collecting credit information compared with other financial institutions. This 
restriction may also reduce bad debt losses. A number of members, by virtue of their close 
relationship to a common bond group, share common goals and purposes as well as a common 
bond relationship with the credit union. DeYoung, Hunter and Udell (2004) noticed that 
“relationship finance” helps improve informational efficiencies, which ensure the efficient flow of 
credit and enhanced growth. Another aspect in which credit unions are unique is the income tax 
exemption. This exemption reduces non-interest expenses and enables credit unions to maintain a 
lower loan interest rate and higher deposit rate, all else being equal (Frame, Karels, and 
McClatchey; 2003). Tokle and Tokle (2000) identified the credit union corporate tax exemption 
as a cost advantage relative to other types of financial institutions. This cost advantage enables 
credit unions to lower interest rates on various financial products and services available to its 
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members, by creating competition with credit unions. A study on the economic benefits of the 
credit union tax exemption by Feinberg and Meade (2014) found that credit union members 
benefitted most from lower interest rates on car loans, with $29.1 billion in savings from 2005-
2013 during the nine year period of the study.  
2.2. Managing credit unions 
Smith (1984) described the idiosyncratic nature of credit union objectives. Smith 
emphasized the monetary gain to credit union members as a key objective of credit union 
management over cost minimization. This research also described the selection of types of loan 
and savings accounts offered and decisions on the prices and/or quantities of those accounts as 
crucial functions of credit union management. In fact, the conflict of interest between members, 
some who join as savers and others who join as borrowers, shapes the strategic objectives of a 
credit union management system (Smith, 1986; Overstreet and Rubin, 1990). An interest margin 
squeeze is generated by the twofold objectives of members with large deposits and members with 
large loans (Bauer, 2008). Goddard, McKillop and Wilson (2008) explained that credit union 
performance primarily depends on the ability of managers to make decisions at the level of staffing, 
governance, and product portfolio. Goddard, McKillop and Wilson added that when credit union 
members participate in management activity voluntarily, their ability and expertise reflects the 
overall performance. Berger and Humphrey (1992) found that managerial ability accounts for 20 
percent or more of cost variations in commercial banking industry.  
2.3. X-efficiency    
 Performance can be measured either by either a cost minimization or a profit maximization 
approach. The profit maximization approach of efficiency measurement is unsuitable for credit 
unions, since making a profit is not the primary objective (Goddard, McKillop and Wilson; 2008). 
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The type of efficiency on which this study focuses is the X-efficiency because it measures 
managers’ ability to make decisions regarding the appropriate input mix to reduce firm level costs. 
Due to an absence of competitive forces, an unidentified type of efficiency – X-(in)efficiency 
exists (Leibenstein, 1966). Leibenstein (1973) argues that motivational deficiencies in resource 
holders increase X-inefficiency.  In an effort to explain X-efficiency at firm-level production, 
Leibenstein (1975) further asserted that manager’s ability to make decisions based on the quantity 
of input makes the difference between maximal utilization and actual utilization, which is a 
measure of the degree of X-inefficiency. Leibenstein (1975) added that if managers are not 
competent enough to enter the industry, if a regulatory system provides some sort of protection, or 
if the users of the services are not aware of the nature of the product, firm-level X-efficiency is 
affected. When it comes to understanding the performances of the commercial banking sector, X-
efficiency is more significant than scale economies (Berger and Humphrey, 1991). Berger (1993) 
defined X-efficiency as the ratio of minimum cost that could be exhausted to the actual cost of 
producing a similar output bundle.  
 Sibbald, Ferguson and McKillop (2002) identified leadership as the key determinant for 
the growth of the credit union industry. The role of managers’ ability in determining credit union 
performance was further emphasized when McKillop, Glass and Ferguson (2002), who 
investigated credit unions in the United Kingdom, found that credit unions were inefficient due to 
lack of competition not only with other financial institutions but also within the industry.  If there 
is a lack of competition between credit unions, that could then justify Leibenstein’s argument that 
difference between maximal utilization and actual utilization in firm-level production amid 
imperfect competition may cause X-(in)efficiency in the credit union industry. 
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 Lang and Welzel (1998) explained that larger banks are able to dominate market power by 
mergers and acquisition, while other banks concentrate on minimizing cost.  However, credit 
unions do not operate with the same objectives as commercial financial institutions.  Bauer, Miles 
and Nishikawa (2009) described that commercial banks may merge to gain on the market value, 
but the aim of credit unions is to improve the deposit amount and lending rates offered to members 
if they decide to improve performance by merger. Goddard, McKillop and Wilson (2002) 
described that the ability to increase business is an advantage for larger credit unions, but smaller 
credit unions strive to survive in business by attracting new members. Smaller credit unions’ 
growth is more manageable than the larger credit unions. In order to improve in X-efficiency, 
credit unions have to reduce cost instead of only opting for merger (Garden and Ralston, 1999). 
According to Garden and Ralston, it is inappropriate to only consider mergers as a tool to improve 
X-efficiency.  
 The structure of a credit union provides more opportunity to reduce operational costs than 
other types of financial institutions.  Upon observing Irish credit unions, Glass, McKillop and 
Rasaratnam (2010) found that 68 percent of Irish credit unions did not face extra opportunity costs 
of conforming with bad debt guidelines due to information advantages the common bond provides 
the credit union industry. Glass and McKillop (2006) described that if credit unions were operated 
in equivalent environments, only minimal differences would have been observed in their 
managerial performance, which is the ability to reduce cost of operation by selecting an appropriate 
input mix. 
2.4. Deregulation  
 Financial deregulation has augmented competition among depository institutions (Bundt 
and Keating, 1988). Black and Dugger (1981) described the effects of gradual deregulation on 
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credit unions. Black and Dugger explained that as a result of legislation passed in 1976, 1978 and 
1980, credit unions were authorized to offer services in the form of longer loan maturities, lines of 
credit, higher loan ceilings, 30 year mortgage loans, and 15 year home improvement loans. These 
pieces of legislation provided credit unions with improved competitive power but weakened the 
traditional image of credit unions serving very specific groups of members with modest means. 
Due to deregulation, adding diversified groups of people under the common bond membership 
was possible (Glass and McKillop, 2006). Deregulation positioned that credit union membership 
is no longer focused upon individuals of “limited financial means”. The 1998 Credit Union 
Membership Access Act permitted credit unions to add select employee groups to their fields of 
membership. Under this Act, a company may offer credit union membership as a benefit to 
employees and their families, can add all of its employees to the member base of the credit union, 
and, without additional fees or operating charges, allow employees to enjoy the benefits of being 
a credit union member. The extension of common bond requirements has provided credit unions 
with access to additional geographic areas which enable them to compete more effectively other 
financial institutions.  
 Diverse regulatory obligations create dissimilar modes of operation for credit unions. State 
chartered credit unions enjoy more liberal regulatory restrictions than federal chartered credit 
unions, which enable larger, state chartered credit unions to exploit growth opportunities more 
than federal chartered credit unions (Goddard, McKillop and Wilson; 2002). In essence state 
chartered credit unions enjoy a lower regulatory burden than federal chartered credit unions.  This 
allows more space for state chartered credit unions to affect credit union policy. Tokle and Tokle 
(2000) observed that occupational and associational federal credit unions can add only new 
common bond groups under 3,000, while community federal credit unions can operate only in a 
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well-defined local area. Apart from the charter types, types of common bond also affect the 
operating environment in the credit union industry. Differences in type of common bond are 
connected to expense preference behavior, as Frame, Karels, and McClatchey (2003) clarified. 
These researchers concluded that residential, common bond credit unions appear to engage in 
expense preference behavior. Credit unions were also found to switch to another type of common 
bond to exploit membership opportunities. Goddard, McKillop and Wilson (2008) noticed a 
number of conversions from occupational common bonds to community common bonds. 
2.5. Off-balance sheet activities  
In an effort to discuss risk reduction through off-balance sheet operations, Boot and Thakor 
(1991) said that banks experience lower asset risk if they have a loan commitment service. 
However Berger and Humphrey (1991) emphasized cost minimization more than mixing services 
with various products as part of off-balance sheet activities. Hassan, Karels and Peterson (1994) 
found empirical evidence of the existence of ‘market discipline’ of off-balance sheet activities and 
termed off-balance sheet items as ‘risk-reducing’. Jagtiani, Nathan and Sick (1995) found little or 
no impact of using off-balance sheet operations on cost, but it was possible to move to an optimal 
output level by using off-balance sheet items. Angbazo (1997) credited off-balance sheet 
operations with helping achieve higher profitability along with higher risk. Inclusion of off-balance 
sheet items in the overall firm level cost function was proposed by Clark and Siems (2002), who 
found cost X-efficiency scores rising with inclusion of off-balance sheet items. In their study of 
European banks, Casu and Girardone (2006) found that most of the impact on technological change 
was caused by off-balance sheet items.  
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2.6. Influence of macroeconomic variables 
 Several studies were conducted to address the influence of macroeconomic variables on 
the behavior of financial institutions. Saunders and Schumacher (2000) found a positive effect of 
macroeconomic policies regarding reduced interest rate volatilities on the reduction of bank 
margins. Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2003) discovered that the merger of banks with other states’ 
banks caused fluctuations of employment growth contracts. Calza, Gartner and Sousa (2003) 
observed loan behaviors and stated that these are related to real GDP and long-term interest rates.  
 Macroeconomic environment also influences the performance credit union industry. Credit 
unions are about 75% as sensitive to macroeconomic shocks as banks (Smith and Woodbury, 
2010). Underserved communities with lower level of income benefit from the services of credit 
unions (Isbister, 1994). On the other hand, the sizes of income at the county level modulate the 
bank-credit union competition (Emmons and Schmid, 2004). The fluctuations in business cycle 
also affect the performance of credit unions.  The cyclical unemployment trends help explains the 
movements of lending growth in credit unions (Smith and Woodbury, 2010). 
In this study we want to observe the differences in X-efficiency of credit unions that 
deregulation in 1998 has brought. We also want to observe the effect of off-balance sheet activities 
on the managerial ability to reduce the costs of operation before and after the deregulation periods 
and before and after the economic down turns. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Theoretical framework  
3.1.1. Approaches to X-efficiency calculation 
 Several studies were published regarding the measurement of firm efficiency. The 
approaches are generally either profit maximization or cost minimization. While measurements of 
technical efficiency and scale efficiency can be done by either of the approaches, the measurement 
of X-efficiency has always been a cost minimization approach. Researchers argue over whether 
the choice of method should be either the data envelopment analysis (DEA) or the stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA) approach. Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages. While 
the former requires no assumption of a production function, the later requires a specification and 
provides error terms. Majumdar (1995), Garden and Ralston (1999), Sathye (2001), Neal (2004), 
and Hassan (2005), used DEA in calculating X-efficiency scores for their studies. While Gardner 
and Grace (1993), DeYoung (1997), Clark and Siems (2002), Kwan (2006), Lieu, Yeh and Chiu 
(2006), and Fu and Heffernan (2007) used SFA in calculating X-efficiency scores for their 
research. This study used the DEA method for calculation of X-efficiency scores of U.S. credit 
unions. 
3.1.2. Production possibility sets 
 The Production Possibility Set (PPS) contains all feasible correspondences of input and 
output vectors. The relative performance of any decision making unit (DMU) can be estimated 
once their position in a PPS is identified. Thanassoulis, Portela and Despic (2008) described the 
theory of PPS as follows. 
 Let the PPS be T, such that 
T = {(x,y) ϵ  +m+s | x can produce y }. 
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 The PPS T contains all the feasible correspondences of input levels x ϵ +m capable of 
producing output levels y ϵ +s. In defining T non-negativity of data +m, +s, +m+s is presumed. 
An input set L(y) is the subset of all input vectors x ϵ +m yielding at least y, and a production set 
P(x) is the subset of all output vectors y ϵ +s that are obtained from x. An input set is defined as 
L(y) = {x | (x, y) ϵ  T} or L(y) = {x |  y ϵ  P(x)} 
 A production technology defined by L(y) has some relevant subsets that are useful for 
efficiency measurement. Two subsets of interest are: the isoquant and the efficient subset. The 
input isoquant of L(y) is defined as 
I(y) = { x | x ϵ L(y), λx  ∉  L(y), λ < 1} 
 The efficient subset of L(y) is defined as  
E(y) = { x | x ϵ L(y),  x’ ≤ x and x’ ≠ x      x’ ∉ L(y) } 
These definitions imply that E(y) ⊆ L(y) 
 Figure 3.1 illustrates the input correspondence for the case of constant returns to scale 
(CRS) technology. The input set L(y) is the space to the right and above the piecewise linear 
boundary (A’ABCDD’). I(y) is the boundary A’ABCDD’ and the efficient subset E(y) is the part 
of the isoquant ABC (without the vertical and horizontal extensions).  
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Figure 3.1: Input space representation 
3.1.3. Theory of cost minimization 
 Nicholson and Snyder (2008) explained the theory of cost minimization as the economic 
cost of any input is the payment required to keep that input in its present employment. If there are 
only two inputs: homogeneous labor (l) and homogeneous capital (k), and perfectly competitive 
market rental rates w and v respectively, then  
total costs = C = wl + vk. 
Mathematically,  
𝑤
𝑣
  =  
𝛿𝑓/𝛿𝑙
𝛿𝑓/𝛿𝑘
 = Marginal rate of technical substitution, RTS (l for k) 
which leads to the optimization principle of cost minimization, which is: in order to minimize the 
cost of any given level of input (qo), the firm should produce at that point on the qo isoquant for 
which the RTS (of l for k) is equal to the ratio of the inputs’ rental prices (w/v). 
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Graphically, given the output isoquant q0, the cost minimizing input combination is l
*, k*. 
The condition for this minimization is that the rate at which k and l can be traded technically which 
should be equal to the rate at which these inputs can be traded in the market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Minimization of costs 
3.1.4. Cost function  
Fried, Lovell and Schmidt (2008) provided the following explanation of cost function:  
Suppose that producers face input prices w = (w1,…wN) ϵ RN++ and seek to minimize 
cost. Then, a minimum cost function, or a cost frontier, is defined as 
c(y,w) = minx{w
Tx : D1(y,x) ≥ 1} 
If the input sets L(y) are closed and convex, and if inputs are freely disposable, the cost frontier 
is dual to the input distance function in the sense of the prior equation of c(y,w) and 
D1(y,x) = minw{w
Tx : c(y,w) ≥ 1} 
C1 
C2 
C3 
qo 
l per period 
k per period 
l* 
k* 
C1 < C2 < C3: Isocost lines 
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A measure of X-efficiency XE is provided by the ratio of minimum cost to actual cost: 
XE(x,y,w) = c(y,w)/wTx 
3.2. Empirical framework 
3.2.1. Evolution of data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
 Farrell (1957) proposed the measurement of technical efficiency as the equiproportional 
reduction of all inputs holding output at current levels. Farrell provided the formulation to handle 
a single output in the case of constant returns to scale (CRS). Farrell and Fieldhouse (1962) later 
amended the method by allowing a linear program in the case of increasing returns to scale. 
Proportional reduction in observed inputs holds the output mix constant. Cost minimization, 
however, requires not only production on the isoquant but also the appropriate mix of inputs that 
depends on the associated input prices. Hence, if technically efficient firms are not using the 
allocatively efficient input mix, these firms could still lower costs by adjusting input levels 
accordingly. Afriat (1972) proposed a formulation for technical efficiency measurement that was 
consistent with data envelopment analysis (DEA). Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994) provided the 
theoretical details of efficiency measurement. In their seminal work, Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 
(1978) used the linear programming method (CCR model) to estimate the empirical production 
technology frontier of an observed decision making unit (DMU) assuming constant returns to 
scale. Their work is marked as the introduction of data envelopment analysis (DEA). Later, 
Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) extended the CCR model (to BCC model) to allow variable 
returns to scale (VRS).  
3.2.2. Input-oriented measures of technical and X-efficiency 
 Coelli et al. (2005) provided the fundamental account of input-oriented measures of 
production technology. In Figure 3.2, the unit isoquant line SS’ represents fully efficient firms, 
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which helps measure the technical efficiency. When any given firm uses P quantities of inputs to 
produce a unit of output, the distance QP represents the technical inefficiency – an amount by 
which input quantities can be reduced without compromising output. The ratio QP/OP represents 
the percentage by which input quantities have to be reduced to achieve technically efficient 
production. The technical efficiency (TE) of a firm is measured by the ratio  
TE = OQ/OP 
which is equal to one minus QP/OP. For a fully technically efficient firm this value is 1. The point 
Q is technically efficient. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Input-oriented measure of technical and X-efficiency  
 The input-oriented measure of technical efficiency of a firm can be expressed in terms of 
input-distance function di(x,y) as: 
TE = 1/ di(x,y) 
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 Any given firm will be on the technical frontier if TE = 1 and di(x,y) is also equal to 1. 
 Measurement of the X-efficiency (XE) requires information on input price. Where: 
  w represents the vector of input prices,  
  x represents the observed vector of inputs used associated with point P 
  xˆ represent the input vector associated with the technically efficient point Q  
  and x* represent the input vector associated with the cost-minimizing input vector 
at Q’. 
 Then X-efficiency of the firm is defined as the ratio of input costs associated with input 
vectors, x and x*, associated with points, P and Q’. Thus  
XE =   
𝑤′𝑥∗
𝑤′𝑥 
  = 
𝑂𝑅
𝑂𝑃
 
 If the input price ratio, represented by the slope of the isocost line, AA’, in Figure 3.2, is 
also known, then allocative efficiency (AE) and technical efficiency measures can be calculated 
using the isocost line. These are given by: 
AE = 
𝑤′𝑥∗
𝑤′𝑥ˆ
  =  
𝑂𝑅
𝑂𝑄
 
TE = 
𝑤′𝑥ˆ
𝑤′𝑥 
  =  
𝑂𝑄
𝑂𝑃
 
 The distance RQ represents the reduction in production costs that would be attained if 
production were to occur at the allocatively (and technically) efficient point Q’, instead of at the 
technically efficient, but allocatively inefficient, point Q. 
  Once TE and AE are known, the total overall X-efficiency (XE) can be expressed 
as a product of technical and allocative efficiency measures: 
TE x AE = (OQ/OP) x (OR/OQ) = (OR/OP) = XE 
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3.2.3. Return to scale assumption   
 The construction of a PPS requires an assumption on the nature of returns to scale. The 
term “returns to scale” describes the technology under which a DMU operates. Returns to scale 
relate to how average product would be affected by scale size if production is efficient. If operation 
is not efficient, changes in average product as scale size changes can be due both to changes in 
efficiency or changes in scale size and it would not be possible to differentiate between the two. 
Thanassoulis, Portela and Despic (2008) explained the difference between constant return to scale 
(CRS) and variable return to scale (VRS) for a single input-output case, which is illustrated in 
figure 3.3. The ray from the origin separates the PPS to the right side of it under the CRS 
assumption. PPS is convex under the VRS assumption and is bound by the right side of VRS 
frontier in figure 3.3. DMU C is inefficient both under CRS and VRS. Input oriented technical 
efficiency under VRS assumption is calculated as EVRS = OA’ / OA, while the measure of technical 
efficiency is calculated in relation to the CRS frontier as ECRS = OA’’ / OA. The difference arises 
because under VRS, DMU C can be compared to virtual DMU C’’, which represents a convex 
combination of two observed DMUs so that it offers the same scale size as C on the output. The 
major difference between CRS and VRS is that the latter does not permit extrapolation of scale 
size from observed DMUs or their convex combination.  
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Figure 3.4: Returns to scale assumption in DEA 
3.2.4. Efficiency calculation by linear programming formulation 
Let input prices faced by credit unions are represented as w = (wl, w2, . . . . wn) ϵ R+,  
 output prices faced by credit unions are represented as p = (p1, p2, . . . . pm) ϵ R+, 
 number of credit unions are represented as k, 
 number of inputs represented as n, 
 number of outputs are represented as m, 
 credit union of interest is represented as I, 
 the intensity variable is represented as z.  
Then n*k will be the input matrix (X) and m*k will be the output matrix (Y). 
3.2.5. Technical efficiency under CRS 
Let, technical efficiency under CRS be TEC. 
Min TECi 
 s. t. 
∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑘𝑧𝑘  ≤ 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑥𝑛𝑖
𝐾
𝑘=1    ; 
∑ 𝑦𝑚𝑘𝑧𝑘 −  𝑦𝑚𝑖  ≥ 0
𝐾
𝑘=1  ; 
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zk ≥ 0 
The firm is technically efficient if TECi = 1.  Conversely if TECi < 1, the firm is technically 
inefficient. 
3.2.6. Technical efficiency under VRS 
Let, technical efficiency under VRS be TEV. 
Min TEVi 
 s. t. 
∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑘𝑧𝑘  ≤ 𝑇𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑥𝑛𝑖
𝐾
𝑘=1    ; 
∑ 𝑦𝑚𝑘𝑧𝑘 −  𝑦𝑚𝑖  ≥ 0
𝐾
𝑘=1  ; 
∑ 𝑧𝑘 = 1
𝐾
𝑘=1  ; 
zk ≥ 0 
 The firm is technically efficient if TEVi = 1. Conversely if TEVi < 1, the firm is technically 
inefficient. 
Scale efficiency is estimated by dividing TECi  by TEVi for each credit union. 
3.2.7. X-efficiency (XE)  
X-efficiency is calculated by dividing the minimum cost under VRS by the actual cost. 
XEi = Ci(w, y, Sv)/ wi xi 
The minimum cost under the VRS technology is solved by the following LP formulation: 
Ci(w, y, Sv)= Min wixi 
 s. t. 
∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑘𝑧𝑘  ≤ 𝑥𝑛𝑖
𝐾
𝑘=1    ; 
∑ 𝑦𝑚𝑘𝑧𝑘 −  𝑦𝑚𝑖  ≥ 0
𝐾
𝑘=1  ; 
∑ 𝑧𝑘 = 1
𝐾
𝑘=1  ; 
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zk ≥ 0 
 Allocative efficiency can be estimated by dividing X-efficiency scores by technical 
efficiency scores under the VRS. 
AEi = Ci(w, y, Sv)/ wi TEVi xi = XEi / TEVi 
3.2.8. Test for efficiency comparison 
 Banker, Zheng and Natarajan (2010) suggest three nonparametric tests for efficiency 
comparison including a median test, the Mann-Whitney test, and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. 
These tests are based on order statistics. The Mann-Whitney test, which is also known as the 
Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney (WMW) test, is used to test the differences in X-efficiency scores 
calculated without off-balance sheet activities and with off-balance sheet activities.  
 The WMW test is run on two independent samples from two populations. It is a statistical 
test of the difference between the two medians (η1 and η2) under the null hypothesis that they have 
no difference. The WMW test requires combining two samples into one column, followed by 
ranking from smallest to largest. Then total rank scores (U) are summed up for the original 
samples.  
An expected score is calculated to test for significance: 
E(U) = nu (N + 1)/2 
where E(U) is the expectation of U, nu is the sample size of the sample being tested, and N is the 
total sample size N = n1 + n2. The difference between the observed and expected rank sums is 
estimated through the use of a normal distribution; the area under the curve of a z-distribution:  
z = 
𝑈−𝐸(𝑈)
√𝑛1𝑛2(𝑁+1)/2
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3.3. Explaining differences in efficiency scores 
 Tobin (1958) introduced the Tobit model specification for analytical purposes pertaining 
to the estimation of relationships for limited dependent variables. DEA X-efficiency scores 
estimated in the first stage are the dependent variables for the Tobit regression. The differences in 
X-efficiency scores are explained in the second stage by some variables not directly included in 
DEA models. In a standard Tobit model the dependent variable is either zero or some positive 
number (Maddala, 1983).  
3.3.1. Tobit model 
yi
* = xiβ + ϵi  where ϵi ~ N(0, σ2). 
y* is a latent variable that is observed for values greater than τ and censored otherwise.  
 The observed y, 
yi = y
*   if y* > τ ; 
yi = τy  if y* <=  τ  
 In a typical tobit model, τ = 0. Thus, 
yi = y
*   if y* > 0 ; 
yi = 0   if y
* <=  0 ; 
 where xi is a vector of explanatory variables, β is a vector of unknown parameters, yi* is a 
latent variable and yi is the efficiency score. 
3.4. Data and variables  
 The NCUA 5300 Call Report from 1994 to 2012 was used as a data source for U.S. credit 
unions. Statistics regarding the unemployment rate, house price index and per capita income were 
collected respectively from data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency, and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis data. To understand the consequences 
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of deregulation in 1998, and the two economic downturns in 2002 and 2008-2009, data were 
divided into four panel datasets for each of the periods – 1994 to 1998, 1999 to 2001, 2002 to 
2007, and 2008 to 2012. Since large versus small banks (applied to credit unions in this study) are 
likely to produce dissimilar services for different customers, differences in terms of asset size may 
produce a misspecification problem (Jagtiani and Khanthavit, 1996). So, in analyzing scale and 
scope economies at large banks, Jagtiani and Khanthavit divided the sample size into four quartiles 
according to asset size. This current research divided credit unions into four quartiles according to 
asset size for each year.  
 Input and output variables for building efficiency models differ among various approaches. 
The most commonly employed approaches are production, intermediation, and profit (Pasiouras, 
2008). Under the production approach, financial institutions are defined as the providers of 
services to the account holders, whereas under the intermediation approach, the role of financial 
institutions is perceived as intermediating funds between savers and investors. Since it is 
challenging to accumulate data on service flow, the book value of the firms (bank) assets is 
presumed to be equivalent to service flow data under intermediation approach. Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) reasoned that the production approach is appropriate for analyzing the efficiency 
of bank branches; however, for the analysis of entire banking institutions, the intermediation 
approach is more suitable. This study adopted the intermediation approach for analyzing 
performance(s) of credit unions as financial intermediaries. As previously indicated, the absence 
of the profit-maximization motive of credit unions makes the profit approach questionable. 
 The identification of input and output variables remains another subject undeveloped and 
open to debate. Table 3.1 lists some of these variables used in existing literature. According to 
Berger and Humphrey (1997), loan and other major assets should be counted as outputs, but debate 
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persists over inclusion of deposits as an input or output variable. This study included fixed assets, 
total deposits, and employee compensation as input variables; on the other hand, this study also 
included total loans, total investments and off-balance sheet items as output variables. Interest 
payments to member deposits by credit unions, and the usability of deposited fund as primary 
investable basis for credit unions validate this inclusion. Cost of input was calculated by the asset 
price (as a ratio of fixed asset to total asset), deposit price (as a ratio of total of interest expense 
plus other expense to total deposit), and the price of labor (as a ratio of personnel expense to total 
asset).   
 To understand the variation in performance across the credit union industry, X-efficiency 
scores were regressed on the total assets and the number of credit union members as size factors 
(Jackson and Fethi, 2000; Loikkanen and Susiluoto, 2002; McDonald, 2009; Ismail, Rahim and 
Majid; 2011); the ratio of net income to total assets as a profitability measure (Jackson and Fethi, 
2000; Chang and Chiu, 2006; Pasiouras, 2008; Altunbas and Marques, 2008; Altunbas, 
Gambacorta and Ibanez, 2010; Ismail, Rahim and Majid; 2011); the ratio of delinquent loan to 
total loans as the delinquency ratio (Fried, Lovell and Eeckaut; 1993; Bauer, Miles and Nishikawa; 
2009); the ratio of total loans to total assets as a measure of intermediation activity (Chang and 
Chiu, 2006; Pasiouras, 2008; Altunbas and Marques, 2008; Altunbas, Gambacorta and Ibanez, 
2010); the ratio of equity to total assets as a measure of capital adequacy (Pasiouras, 2008 and 
Altunbas, Gambacorta and Ibanez, 2010, Ismail, Rahim and Majid; 2011); the ratio of total 
customer loans to total deposits as a measure of deposit activity (Altunbas and Marques, 2008); 
the number of branches (Pasiouras, 2008) and charter type as a dummy variable to differentiate 
among institutional categories (Jackson and Fethi, 2000; Chang and Chiu, 2006 ; Altunbas, 
Gambacorta and Ibanez, 2010); and macroeconomic variables such as house price index 
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representing housing market (Drake, Hall and Simper, 2006; Koetter and Poghosyan, 2010), the 
unemployment rate (Loh and Tan, 2002), and per capita income (Attanasio, Goldberg and 
Kyriazidou; 2008). 
Table 3.1: Input and output variables under the intermediation approach 
Studies/Reference  Input variables Output variables 
 
Rangan et al (1988) Employee compensation, 
capital, purchased funds 
 
Loans, deposits 
Aly et al (1990) 
 
Employee compensation, 
capital, loanable funds 
 
Loans, demand deposit 
 
Burger and Humphrey (1991) 
 
Labor compensation, 
purchased funds, capital 
 
Deposits, loans 
 
Yue (1992) Interest expenses, Non-
interest expenses, deposits 
 
Interest income, non-interest 
income, total loans 
 
Casu  and Molyneux (2003) Total expenses (interest, non-
interest, personnel), total 
deposits 
Total loans, other earning 
assets, off-balance sheet 
items 
 
Staub, Souza, and Tabak 
(2010) 
Operational expenses net of 
personnel expenses, 
personnel expenses, interest 
expenses 
 
Total loans net of provision 
loan, investments, deposits 
 
Ismail, Rahim and Majid 
(2011) 
 
Fixed assets, total deposits, 
personnel expenses 
 
Total loans, other earning 
assets, off-balance sheet 
items 
Doumpos and Zopounidis 
(2013) 
Deposits and short-term 
funding, fixed assets, loan 
loss provisions 
 
Loans, other earning assets 
 
3.5. Summary statistics  
 The averages of input and output variables (in million dollars) are presented in the Table 
3.2 and Table 3.3 by asset quartiles and by study periods.  
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Table 3.2: Input and output variables (average) of non-metro credit unions (in million dollars) 
Quartile Period Observations Total assets, $ Fixed assets, $ Deposits, $ Compensation, $ Loans, $ Investments, $ OBS, $ 
1st  1994-1998 10,435 0.707 0.003 0.595 0.013 0.453 0.222 0.008 
1999-2001 5,802 0.926 0.004 0.763 0.018 0.568 0.315 0.007 
2002-2007 9,288 1.503 0.008 1.241 0.030 0.861 0.546 0.038 
2008-2012 6,635 2.147 0.014 1.776 0.046 1.090 0.637 0.115 
2nd  1994-1998 10,430 3.173 0.025 2.732 0.059 2.078 0.979 0.076 
1999-2001 5,799 4.424 0.043 3.759 0.086 2.793 1.401 0.197 
2002-2007 9,288 7.213 0.098 6.116 0.140 4.091 2.635 0.510 
2008-2012 6,630 10.589 0.173 9.016 0.205 5.291 3.637 1.029 
3rd  1994-1998 10,430 10.026 0.152 8.750 0.175 6.365 3.229 0.817 
1999-2001 5,799 14.298 0.251 12.347 0.259 9.075 4.360 1.485 
2002-2007 9,288 23.373 0.492 20.125 0.435 13.867 7.727 3.045 
2008-2012 6,635 35.934 0.882 31.278 0.652 19.528 11.127 5.423 
4th  1994-1998 10,430 103.712 1.901 90.865 1.523 65.221 33.799 18.914 
1999-2001 5,799 152.637 2.880 132.409 2.336 100.453 43.101 28.489 
2002-2007 9,282 284.886 5.737 241.968 4.312 189.674 74.886 70.347 
2008-2012 6,630 468.656 10.603 397.232 7.011 299.889 114.215 142.00
0 
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Table 3.3: Input and output variables (average) of metro credit unions (in million dollars) 
Quartil
e 
Period Observations Total assets, $ Fixed assets, $ Deposits, $ Compensation, $ Loans, $ Investments, $ OBS, $ 
1st  1994-1998  2,975  0.977 0.005 0.828 0.018 0.643 0.298 0.005 
1999-2001  1,698  1.339 0.007 1.113 0.026 0.850 0.426 0.011 
2002-2007  2,778  2.296 0.014 1.917 0.045 1.323 0.828 0.082 
2008-2012  1,950  3.319 0.024 2.770 0.068 1.680 1.062 0.236 
2nd  1994-1998  2,970  4.166 0.041 3.597 0.074 2.712 1.295 0.149 
1999-2001  1,695  5.736 0.071 4.886 0.107 3.720 1.708 0.324 
2002-2007  2,772  9.260 0.148 7.892 0.172 5.462 3.165 0.811 
2008-2012  1,945  13.948 0.299 12.028 0.254 7.219 4.450 1.661 
3rd  1994-1998  2,970  12.693 0.220 11.101 0.214 8.048 4.086 1.108 
1999-2001  1,695  17.789 0.361 15.415 0.317 11.381 5.252 2.053 
2002-2007  2,772  29.551 0.767 25.569 0.539 17.712 9.412 4.059 
2008-2012  1,950  45.041 1.248 39.256 0.809 24.822 13.824 7.004 
4th  1994-1998  2,970  105.304 2.264 93.385 1.629 69.083 31.065 17.872 
1999-2001  1,695  155.031 3.493 136.172 2.508 107.788 37.580 26.731 
2002-2007  2,772  281.289 6.647 244.515 4.566 190.919 70.256 71.466 
2008-2012  1,945  492.470 12.797 428.568 7.455 304.682 120.753 152.452 
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
4.1. First Stage: data envelopment analysis (DEA)   
This study attempted to observe the performances of non-metro and metro credit unions 
separately because the nature of relationships with borrowers in locally owned smaller banks 
requires local bankers to possess more expertise in the needs and circumstances of local producers 
than employees of large regional banks (Neff and Ellinger, 1996). It is also possible that in a less 
competitive rural market one dominant lending institution may affect relationship-based and small 
business lending (Cyree and Spurlin, 2012). 
Table 4.1 exhibits various measures of efficiencies to understand the different aspects of 
production techniques. Technical efficiency (TE) scores under VRS were calculated to compare 
performance under concurrent technologies, scale efficiency (SE) scores were calculated to 
compare performance at the optimal size of firm level operation, allocative efficiency (AE) scores 
were calculated to compare the ability to mix inputs that produce at minimum cost, and X-
efficiency (XE) scores under VRS were calculated to compare managements’ ability to operate 
with minimum operation cost.   
Non-metro credit unions in the first quartile performed relatively lower than results 
reported in other studies. Glass and McKillop (2006) estimated cost efficiency as 91% 
(approximately) for larger credit unions during 1994 to 2001. Doumpos and Zopounidis (2013) 
found that cooperatives were 75.5% technically efficient and 91.4% scale efficient during 2005 to 
2010 when viewing European cooperatives. This current study found that the first quartile of non-
metro credit unions improved efficiency immediately after the enactment of Credit Union 
Membership Access Act (1998). The most improvement was observed in scale efficiency, which 
increased by 7.4% (See Table 4.1). The improvement in average X-efficiency score rose by 4.5%.
  
 
3
2
 
Table 4.1: Efficiency scores of non-metro credit unions  
Quartile Period 
Technical 
efficiency  
X-
efficiency 
Scale 
efficiency 
Allocative 
efficiency 
Technical 
efficiency 
with OBS 
X-
efficiency 
with OBS 
Scale 
efficiency 
with OBS 
Allocative 
efficiency 
with OBS 
  
 1st 
  
  
1994-1998 0.635 0.515 0.506 0.811 0.637 0.516 0.509 0.811 
1999-2001 0.660 0.560 0.580 0.847 0.663 0.563 0.585 0.847 
2002-2007 0.697 0.610 0.615 0.875 0.704 0.616 0.621 0.875 
2008-2012 0.625 0.515 0.578 0.824 0.639 0.533 0.607 0.833 
  
 2nd 
  
  
1994-1998 0.724 0.592 0.900 0.826 0.736 0.604 0.906 0.828 
1999-2001 0.702 0.548 0.893 0.790 0.714 0.560 0.899 0.792 
2002-2007 0.701 0.611 0.870 0.877 0.716 0.624 0.879 0.877 
2008-2012 0.722 0.652 0.918 0.906 0.749 0.680 0.923 0.911 
  
 3rd 
  
  
1994-1998 0.787 0.739 0.935 0.940 0.795 0.749 0.938 0.943 
1999-2001 0.742 0.694 0.922 0.938 0.750 0.701 0.924 0.938 
2002-2007 0.747 0.686 0.918 0.919 0.764 0.706 0.923 0.926 
2008-2012 0.761 0.712 0.944 0.938 0.770 0.720 0.943 0.938 
  
 4th 
  
  
1994-1998 0.710 0.673 0.898 0.951 0.734 0.697 0.909 0.952 
1999-2001 0.654 0.581 0.891 0.891 0.689 0.616 0.903 0.898 
2002-2007 0.637 0.563 0.896 0.887 0.669 0.599 0.907 0.899 
2008-2012 0.709 0.671 0.877 0.950 0.718 0.679 0.877 0.950 
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The ability to add member groups might have helped credit unions increase fee income from 
additional services offered to members. The increase in average X-efficiency score also indicates 
the progress in managerial ability to reduce the cost ratio relative to total output produced. Credit 
unions x-efficiency increased after the recession in 2002. A 5% increase in XE in comparison with 
previous time periods revealed that managers’ ability to operate at minimum cost helped non-
metro credit unions to withstand the economic downturn. However, after the financial crisis in 
2008-2009, non-metro credit unions suffered in all measurements of performance. Average XE 
scores faced a sharp decline of 9.5% compared to the previous time period. The contribution of 
off-balance sheet items to XE scores from 1994 to 2001 did not lead to a statistically different score 
(See Table 4.2). During the economic crisis, OBS items helped improve the XE scores. Non-metro 
credit union XE scores increased more after the crisis of 2008-09 than during 2002-07. This may 
suggest that, even though during the period of largest decline in managerial performance, this 
quartile of non-metro credit unions successfully improved performance through the use of OBS 
activities. 
 The second quartile of non-metro credit unions showed greater improvement in TE, SE 
and AE scores than the first quartile throughout the study periods. The most noticeable 
improvement was observed in the average scale efficiency scores compared to any other efficiency 
measures. If we compare score averages of first and second quartiles of non-metro credit unions 
by periods, the averages in second quartile was at least 25% more than that of first quartile periods 
(See Table 4.1). Average scale efficiency scores in third and fourth quartiles were maintained 
around the score averages of second quartile. This may help infer that asset size supports 
developing the capability to perform at optimal size; in our observation of all non-metro credit 
unions, credit unions needed to be at least at second quartile to see improvement in scale efficiency 
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and they maintained it for other upper quartiles. Unlike the first quartile, this quartile of non-metro 
credit unions did not appear to benefit from deregulation, at least from the effects of the Credit 
Union Membership Access Act. On the contrary, these credit unions struggled to maintain 
performance during 1999-2001. However after the recession in 2002, this quartile exhibited 
improvement in AE and XE scores by 8.7% and 6.3% respectively. The ability to choose an 
optimal array of inputs helped this set of credit unions reduce operational costs, which was 
reflected in maintaining better managerial performance. After the financial crisis in 2008-09, this 
quartile of credit unions continued gaining in efficiency scores. The contribution of OBS items 
significantly improved performance throughout continuing periods (p <.0001). Similar to the first 
quartile, this quartile of non-metro credit unions also achieved better XE scores during 2008-12 
through OBS activities. 
Credit unions composing the third quartile exhibited better overall performance than the 
smaller quartiles in all efficiency measures. During the 1998-2001 time period, this asset group of 
credit unions also failed to capture the benefits of deregulation. Similar to the previous quartiles, 
this group of non-metro credit unions also struggled to maintain performances and scored lower 
than in the previous period. Unlike the first and second quartiles, the economic recession of 2002 
reduced the overall efficiency performance during 2002-2007 for this quartile of credit unions. 
The effect of economic downturn may bring different consequences to credit unions of different 
asset size. The ability to act within a changed economic environment may also vary according to 
asset size. After the financial crisis in 2008-2009, this quartile showed improvement in efficiency 
scores. For this quartile, the contribution of OBS items in improving efficiency scores was 
significant (p<.0001) throughout the study periods.  
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 Non-metro credit unions in the fourth quartile group were less efficient than those in the 
third quartile. This financial performance of credit unions in this quartile also did not benefit after 
the enactment of Credit Union Membership Access Act 1998. The decline in performance 
continued after the recession in 2002 as well. With the end of the financial crisis in 2008-2009, 
non-metro credit unions in this quartile improved their overall performance. The greatest 
improvement was seen in the XE score, an increase of 10.8% over the earlier period. The 
contribution of OBS activities towards the improvement in performance was significant (p<.0001) 
throughout the study period (See Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2: Test of differences in X-efficiency scores without OBS activities and with OBS 
activities (non-metro credit unions) 
Time Period Quartile-1 Quartile-2 
Z-value p-value Difference Z-value p-value Difference 
1994-1998 0.350 0.727 No 5.845 <.0001 Yes 
1999-2001 0.920 0.357 No 4.100 <.0001 Yes 
2002-2007 2.425 0.015 Yes 6.921 <.0001 Yes 
2008-2012 6.160 <.0001 Yes 13.689 <.0001 Yes 
 Quartile-3 Quartile-4 
Z-value p-value Difference Z-value p-value Difference 
1994-1998 9.017 <.0001 Yes 16.850 <.0001 Yes 
1999-2001 4.047 <.0001 Yes 17.364 <.0001 Yes 
2002-2007 11.920 <.0001 Yes 19.630 <.0001 Yes 
2008-2012 3.910 <.0001 Yes 3.909 <.0001 Yes 
 
Credit unions composing the third quartile exhibited better overall performance than the 
smaller quartiles in all efficiency measures. During the 1998-2001 time period, this asset group of 
credit unions also failed to capture the benefits of deregulation. Similar to the previous quartiles, 
this group of non-metro credit unions also struggled to maintain performances and scored lower 
than in the previous period. Unlike the first and second quartiles, the economic recession of 2002 
reduced the overall efficiency performance during 2002-2007 for this quartile of credit unions. 
The effect of economic downturn may bring different consequences to credit unions of different 
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asset size. The ability to act within a changed economic environment may also vary according to 
asset size. After the financial crisis in 2008-2009, this quartile showed improvement in efficiency 
scores. For this quartile, the contribution of OBS items in improving efficiency scores was 
significant (p<.0001) throughout the study periods. 
Metro credit union average TE and SE scores (See Table 4.3) were greater than average 
European cooperative bank TE and SE scores, which were 75.5% and 91.4% respectively 
(Doumpos and Zopounidis, 2013). However, the XE score average, which is an indicator of 
managers’ ability to operate at minimum cost, was lower than the cost efficiency score of credit 
unions (91%) calculated by Glass and McKillop (2006). One possible explanation for this finding 
may be that Glass and McKillop (2006) observed only larger credit unions. According to Glass 
and McKillop, smaller credit unions might have relied upon unpaid volunteers and availed 
themselves of subsidized rates on premises and equipment that would have provided them with an 
unequal comparison in reducing cost of operation to a minimum. In this study of all sizes of credit 
unions, the assumption of cost advantages for small scale credit unions by Glass and McKillop 
was not established.  
Metro credit unions in the first quartile group exhibited greater efficiency scores when 
compared with the first quartile of non-metro credit unions. In comparison with non-metro credit 
unions’ average TE, XE, SE and AE scores during 1994-1998, metro credit unions scored higher 
by 15.7, 19.3, 33.5 and 8.8 percent respectively (See Table 4.3). The most difference was observed 
in the average SE score. The persistence of the result suggests metro credit unions may have the 
ability to operate at optimal size better than non-metro credit unions. After deregulation in 1998, 
performance in all measures was reduced, and the largest reduction was observed in  
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Table 4.3: Efficiency scores of metro credit unions 
Quartile Period 
Technical 
efficiency  
X-
efficiency 
Scale 
efficiency 
Allocative 
efficiency 
Technical 
efficiency 
with OBS 
X-
efficiency 
with OBS 
Scale 
efficiency 
with OBS 
Allocative 
efficiency 
with OBS 
  
 1st 
  
  
1994-1998 0.792 0.708 0.841 0.899 0.795 0.711 0.845 0.900 
1999-2001 0.768 0.678 0.546 0.890 0.776 0.686 0.565 0.891 
2002-2007 0.819 0.757 0.889 0.925 0.831 0.769 0.891 0.927 
2008-2012 0.762 0.646 0.855 0.852 0.779 0.666 0.874 0.858 
  
 2nd 
  
  
1994-1998 0.834 0.800 0.952 0.961 0.844 0.811 0.954 0.962 
1999-2001 0.812 0.782 0.949 0.965 0.825 0.796 0.949 0.967 
2002-2007 0.818 0.782 0.940 0.958 0.839 0.803 0.945 0.958 
2008-2012 0.788 0.738 0.942 0.938 0.806 0.756 0.946 0.940 
  
 3rd 
  
  
1994-1998 0.856 0.824 0.951 0.965 0.867 0.836 0.955 0.966 
1999-2001 0.861 0.833 0.956 0.969 0.866 0.837 0.956 0.967 
2002-2007 0.864 0.837 0.953 0.969 0.879 0.851 0.958 0.969 
2008-2012 0.840 0.800 0.942 0.954 0.846 0.806 0.941 0.954 
  
 4th 
  
  
1994-1998 0.872 0.852 0.966 0.978 0.885 0.865 0.969 0.978 
1999-2001 0.860 0.846 0.959 0.984 0.867 0.851 0.960 0.983 
2002-2007 0.839 0.814 0.952 0.971 0.849 0.824 0.955 0.971 
2008-2012 0.797 0.770 0.937 0.967 0.807 0.780 0.935 0.967 
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average SE score compared to the earlier period the average SE score in this circumstance was 
29.5% lower. Metro credit unions were able to improve performance after the recession in 2002. 
The XE score average increased by 7.9% compared to the earlier period while the SE score average 
recovered. During the recovery period after the financial crisis in 2008-2009, along with reductions 
in other measures, XE and AE scores were reduced by 11.1% and 7.3% respectively. The ability 
to operate with an appropriate input mix aiming at cost reduction may have lowered the XE score. 
OBS items did not significantly affect efficiency scores in the time periods before 2002 (See Table 
4.4). However, credit unions were able to improve average XE scores significantly (p<.0001) after 
the economic recession through OBS activities. The second quartile of metro credit unions was 
more efficient in all measures than the smaller quartile. After the enactment of the Credit Union 
Membership Access Act 1998, average efficiency scores decreased, but credit unions in this 
quartile were able to maintain the efficiency scores after recession in 2002. Similar to the previous 
quartile, credit unions in this quartile also could not maintain the cost ratio of earlier period; the 
XE score average decreased by 4.4% compared to the previous time period. For this asset group, 
OBS items significantly (?) increased XE scores throughout the study period.   
Table 4.4: Test of differences in X-efficiency scores without OBS activities and with OBS 
activities (metro credit unions) 
Time Period Quartile-1 Quartile-2 
Z-value p-value Difference Z-value p-value Difference 
1994-1998 1.104 0.269 No 5.129 <.0001 Yes 
1999-2001 1.735 0.083 No 4.598 <.0001 Yes 
2002-2007 3.856 0.0001 Yes 7.570 <.0001 Yes 
2008-2012 4.350 <.0001 Yes 4.993 <.0001 Yes 
 Quartile-3 Quartile-4 
Z-value p-value Difference Z-value p-value Difference 
1994-1998 6.535 <.0001 Yes 8.216 <.0001 Yes 
1999-2001 1.454 0.146 No 2.812 0.005 Yes 
2002-2007 6.471 <.0001 Yes 4.953 <.0001 Yes 
2008-2012 1.917 0.055 No 2.939 0.003 Yes 
   
39 
 
The third quartile group of metro credit unions displayed improved performance compared 
to the first and second quartiles of metro credit unions and the X-efficiency score average is highest 
for this quartile among the all four quartiles during the economic recovery period (2008-2012). 
The average efficiency score improved in all measures during the period of 1998-2001 relative to 
first and second quartiles. Limited improvement in efficiency scores was observed after the 
recession in 2002. Like all other quartiles of metro credit unions the X-efficiency scores average 
also got decreased for this quartile of group after the financial crisis of 2008-09. The XE score 
average declined more than any other efficiency measures. Credit union manager’s ability to make 
decisions regarding proper input mix to ensure firm operations at a minimum cost diminished. 
However, this quartile of credit unions showed better efficiency scores in all measures after the 
economic downturns in comparison with all other quartiles regardless of location. The impact of 
OBS items to improve the XE efficiency scores average was not significant after deregulation in 
1998 or after the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Even so, credit unions experienced positive 
development in efficiency scores throughout the periods before deregulation and after the 
economic recession in 2002 by utilizing OBS activities. 
 The efficiency score averages were highest across all credit union quartile groups in the 
time periods before the economic recession of 2002 for the fourth quartile of metro credit unions. 
Efficiency scores decreased after deregulation in 1998. In fact, this quartile experienced a 
continuing decline in efficiency score averages for subsequent periods as well. Despite being the 
largest asset size group, these credit unions did not improve performance under the structural 
changes imposed by deregulation and the economic downturn. Managerial ability to operate at 
minimum cost weakened more during the recovery periods after each of the economic down turns 
than their ability was at the beginning of the study period, after the membership act and before the 
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financial crisis. The contribution of OBS items towards better managerial performance was 
significant (p<.0001) throughout the study periods.  
4.2. Explaining the differences in efficiency scores 
 
To better understand the effect of environmental variables on the differences of managerial 
performances in metro and non-metro credit unions throughout the study periods the Tobit 
regression results and analyses were prepared. Irrespective of the locations of credit unions and 
their quartiles, profitability of credit unions was found negatively related with the managerial 
performances. Which helps infer that credit unions shouldn’t target to improve both the X-
efficiency and profitability together; a drive towards the profit making strategies may increase the 
cost ratio. Capital adequacy, which is a measure of total equity to total asset, had a positive effect 
on the X-efficiency scores. More equity investment in credit unions helps the managers better to 
manage the operations. Deposit activity, a ratio of total loans to total deposits, was positively 
related with X-efficiency scores. So, if more loans are offered, it helps credit unions keeping the 
cost ratio low. A more in-depth discussion on the effects of each of the environment variables is 
presented below.  
Total assets: With an increase in the amount of total assets, X-efficiency scores improved 
for the first and third quartiles for non-metro credit unions (See Tables 4.5 to 4.12). The second 
and fourth quartiles groups of non-metro credit unions showed slight negative performance 
measures with the increase in asset size during the recovery period after the financial crisis in 
2008-2009. Metro credit unions exhibited improvement in XE scores with the increase in total 
assets. However for the second quartile group of metro credit unions, improvement was not 
significant during the period 1999-2001or for the third quartile of metro credit unions during the 
recovery period of 2008-2012. In general, asset size has a significant (p<.0001) impact on the XE 
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score for all credit unions. In some cases negative, or no impact was observed during economic 
recovery periods. 
Number of members: The first quartile of non-metro credit unions showed significant 
(p<.0001) improvement in XE scores with the increase in the number of members during the period 
before deregulation occurred and the time period after the economic recession in 2002 (See Tables 
4.5 to 4.12). But for all other quartiles throughout the study period, the impact of the number of 
members on XE scores was negative (p<.0013). For the first quartile of metro credit unions, the 
impact of number of members on the XE score was positive (p<.0001) before the economic 
recessions. But for all other quartile groups of metro credit unions, the impact was negative 
(p<.0013) throughout the study period. The number of members may have had some positive 
impact on XE scores in the past for lower asset size groups, but in general the impact of the number 
of members on credit unions’ managerial performance is negative (p<.06). There might be a trade-
off between the number of members and the X-efficiency of credit unions in higher asset bands.  
 Profitability: The ratio of operating income to total asset was the measure for profitability. 
For the first and second quartile of non-metro credit unions, the impact of credit unions’ 
profitability on XE scores was significantly negative during the periods 1994-98 and 2002-07 
(Table 4.5 to 4.12); the impact was insignificant during the periods 1999-01 and 2008-12 (p>.14). 
For the third quartile of non-metro credit unions, the impact was significantly negative from 1994 
to 2007 (p<.0001) and became insignificant in 2008-12 (p=0.44). For the fourth quartile of non-
metro credit unions, the impact of profitability on the XE score was significantly negative 
throughout the study period (p<.03).  For the first and third quartile of metro credit unions, the 
impact of credit unions’ profitability on the XE score was significantly negative during the periods 
1994-98 and 2002-07 (p<.0017); the impact was insignificant during the periods 1999-01 and 
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Table 4.5: Tobit regression for XE scores of 1st quartile of non-metro credit unions 
 Estimates for 1st quartile (without OBS) Estimates for 1st quartile (with OBS) 
Parameter 1994-1998 1999-2001 2002-2007 2008-2012 1994-1998 1999-2001 2002-2007 2008-2012 
Intercept -1.792* 
(<.0001) 
-1.422* 
(<.0001) 
-1.082* 
(<.0001) 
-0.956* 
(<.0001) 
-1.803* 
(<.0001) 
-1.449* 
(<.0001) 
-1.105* 
(<.0001) 
-0.976* 
(<.0001) 
Total assets 0.165* 
(<.0001) 
0.144* 
(<.0001) 
0.100* 
(<.0001) 
0.091* 
(<.0001) 
0.165* 
(<.0001) 
0.145* 
(<.0001) 
0.099* 
(<.001) 
0.091* 
(<.0001) 
Total membership 0.011* 
(<.0001) 
-0.001 
(0.803) 
0.018* 
(<.0001) 
-0.008* 
(0.040) 
0.011* 
(<.0001) 
0.001 
(0.810) 
0.023* 
(<.0001) 
-0.004 
(0.300) 
Profitability -0.451* 
(<.0001) 
0.089 
(0.140) 
-0.695* 
(<.0001) 
-0.002 
(0.981) 
-0.442* 
(<.0001) 
0.109** 
(0.076) 
-0.679* 
(<.0001) 
0.145** 
(0.087) 
Delinquency 0.068* 
(<.0001) 
0.073* 
(<.0001) 
0.169* 
(<.0001) 
0.050* 
(0.020) 
0.067* 
(<.0001) 
0.069* 
(0.0003) 
0.160* 
(<.0001) 
0.031 
(0.157) 
Intermediation activity 0.046* 
(<.0001) 
-0.616* 
(<.0001) 
-0.060* 
(0.002) 
0.142* 
(<.0001) 
0.047* 
(<.0001) 
-0.609* 
(<.0001) 
-0.060* 
(0.003) 
0.179* 
(<.0001) 
Capital adequacy 0.615* 
(<.0001) 
0.212* 
(<.0001) 
0.624* 
(<.0001) 
0.709* 
(<.0001) 
0.618* 
(<.0001) 
0.213* 
(<.0001) 
0.630* 
(<.0001) 
0.743* 
(<.0001) 
Deposit activity 0.008* 
(<.0001) 
0.403* 
(<.0001) 
0.129* 
(<.0001) 
0.028* 
(0.044) 
0.008* 
(0.002) 
0.402* 
(<.0001) 
0.133* 
(<.0001) 
0.021 
(0.144) 
HPI -0.001* 
(<.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.160) 
-0.0004* 
(<.0001) 
-0.00003 
(0.203) 
-0.001* 
(<.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.143) 
-0.0004* 
(<.0001) 
0.000 
(0.165) 
Income per capita 0.0003 
(0.697) 
0.004* 
(<.0001) 
0.004* 
(<.0001) 
0.002* 
(0.006) 
0.0004* 
(0.002) 
0.004* 
(<.0001) 
0.004* 
(<.0001) 
0.002* 
(0.013) 
Unemployment rate 0.192* 
(0.001) 
0.108 
(0.292) 
0.956* 
(<.0001) 
-0.401* 
(<.0001) 
0.181* 
(0.002) 
0.126 
(0.226) 
0.897* 
(<.0001) 
-0.385* 
(<.0001) 
Federal charter -0.005** 
(0.076) 
0.002 
(0.600) 
-0.006* 
(0.034) 
-0.012* 
(0.001) 
-0.005* 
(0.002) 
-0.0001 
(0.977) 
-0.009* 
(0.0006) 
-0.012* 
(0.002) 
Number of branches   -0.005* 
(0.022) 
0.004 
(0.489) 
  -0.004** 
(0.066) 
0.003 
(0.566) 
* is significant at 5% level   ** is significant at 10% level  
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Table 4.6: Tobit regression for XE scores of 2nd quartile of non-metro credit unions 
 Estimates for 2nd quartile (without OBS) Estimates for 2nd quartile (with OBS) 
Parameter 1994-1998 1999-2001 2002-2007 2008-2012 1994-1998 1999-2001 2002-2007 2008-2012 
Intercept -1.271* 
(<.0001) 
-4.428* 
(<.0001) 
-3.169* 
(<.0001) 
1.02* 
(<.0001) 
-1.402* 
(<.0001) 
-4.526* 
(<.0001) 
-3.316* 
(<.0001) 
0.677* 
(<.0001) 
Total assets 0.132* 
(<.0001) 
0.315* 
(<.0001) 
0.250* 
(<.0001) 
-0.011* 
(0.020) 
0.138* 
(<.0001) 
0.320* 
(<.0001) 
0.256* 
(<.0001) 
0.007 
(0.163) 
Total membership -0.012* 
(<.0001) 
-0.024* 
(<.0001) 
-0.047* 
(<.0001) 
-0.060* 
(<.0001) 
-0.008* 
(0.008) 
-0.026* 
(<.0001) 
-0.044* 
(<.0001) 
-0.06* 
(<.0001) 
Profitability -0.913* 
(<.0001) 
0.129 
(0.186) 
-0.507* 
(<.0001) 
0.150 
(0.203) 
-0.681* 
(<.0001) 
0.439* 
(<.0001) 
-0.430* 
(<.0001) 
0.466* 
(0.0002) 
Delinquency 0.435* 
(<.0001) 
0.277* 
(<.0001) 
0.300* 
(<.0001) 
0.199* 
(0.001) 
0.355* 
(<.0001) 
0.207* 
(<.0001) 
0.221* 
(<.0001) 
0.026 
(0.6667) 
Intermediation activity -0.362* 
(<.0001) 
0.011 
(0.781) 
-0.275* 
(<.0001) 
-0.254* 
(0.0002) 
-0.360* 
(<.0001) 
0.029 
(0.514) 
-0.271* 
(<.0001) 
-0.236* 
(0.0011) 
Capital adequacy 0.456* 
(<.0001) 
0.548* 
(<.0001) 
0.420* 
(<.0001) 
0.452* 
(<.0001) 
0.411* 
(<.0001) 
0.536* 
(<.0001) 
0.405* 
(<.0001) 
0.443* 
(<.0001) 
Deposit activity 0.259* 
(<.0001) 
0.121* 
(0.0003) 
0.278* 
(<.0001) 
0.318* 
(<.0001) 
0.251* 
(<.0001) 
0.100* 
(0.005) 
0.278* 
(<.0001) 
0.293* 
(<.0001) 
HPI -0.0006* 
(<.0001) 
0.000 
(0.663) 
-0.0002* 
(<.0001) 
0.0002* 
(<.0001) 
-0.001* 
(<.0001) 
0.0002* 
(0.014) 
-0.0002* 
(<.0001) 
0.000* 
(<.0001) 
Income per capita 0.002* 
(0.0023) 
0.006* 
(<.0001) 
0.005* 
(<.0001) 
0.002* 
(0.024) 
0.003* 
(<.0001) 
0.00711* 
(<.0001) 
0.007 
(0.2403) 
0.007* 
(<.0001) 
Unemployment rate 0.259* 
(<.0001) 
0.170** 
(0.057) 
0.522* 
(<.0001) 
0.580* 
(<.0001) 
0.158* 
(0.016) 
0.097 
(0.312) 
0.514* 
(<.0001) 
0.492* 
(<.0001) 
Federal charter -0.0004 
(0.881) 
0.006* 
(0.020) 
0.004** 
(0.077) 
-0.010* 
(0.0003) 
-0.002 
(0.418) 
0.005** 
(0.081) 
0.003* 
(<.0001) 
-0.012* 
(<.0001) 
Number of branches   0.015* 
(<.0001) 
0.003 
(0.213) 
  0.015* 
(<.0001) 
0.003 
(0.285) 
* is significant at 5% level   ** is significant at 10% level  
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Table 4.7: Tobit regression for XE scores of 3rd quartile of non-metro credit unions 
 Estimates for 3rd quartile (without OBS) Estimates for 3rd quartile (with OBS) 
Parameter 1994-1998 1999-2001 2002-2007 2008-2012 1994-1998 1999-2001 2002-2007 2008-2012 
Intercept 0.064** 
(0.071) 
-0.430* 
(<.0001) 
-0.410* 
(<.0001) 
0.629* 
(<.0001) 
0.086* 
(0.016) 
-0.42* 
(<.0001) 
-0.561* 
(<.0001) 
0.729* 
(<.0001) 
Total assets 0.036* 
(<.0001) 
0.066* 
(<.0001) 
0.065* 
(<.0001) 
0.020* 
(<.0001) 
0.033* 
(<.0001) 
0.066* 
(<.0001) 
0.071* 
(<.0001) 
0.015* 
(0.0003) 
Total membership -0.009* 
(<.0001) 
-0.012* 
(0.0002) 
-0.020* 
(<.0001) 
-0.057* 
(<.0001) 
-0.007* 
(0.0003) 
-0.015* 
(<.0001) 
-0.020* 
(<.0001) 
-0.06* 
(<.0001) 
Profitability -0.460* 
(<.0001) 
-0.491* 
(<.0001) 
-0.474* 
(<.0001) 
0.080 
(0.437) 
-0.441* 
(<.0001) 
-0.309* 
(0.007) 
-0.427* 
(<.0001) 
0.197** 
(0.071) 
Delinquency 0.227* 
(<.0001) 
0.353* 
(<.0001) 
0.401* 
(<.0001) 
0.282* 
(<.0001) 
0.184* 
(<.0001) 
0.273* 
(0.0002) 
0.223* 
(0.0012) 
0.225* 
(0.0013) 
Intermediation activity -0.281* 
(<.0001) 
-0.425* 
(<.0001) 
-0.820* 
(<.0001) 
-0.538* 
(<.0001) 
-0.307* 
(<.0001) 
-0.424* 
(<.0001) 
-0.776* 
(<.0001) 
-0.586* 
(<.0001) 
Capital adequacy 0.547* 
(<.0001) 
0.456* 
(<.0001) 
0.263* 
(<.0001) 
0.279* 
(<.0001) 
0.513* 
(<.0001) 
0.457* 
(<.0001) 
0.179* 
(<.0001) 
0.216* 
(<.0001) 
Deposit activity 0.403* 
(<.0001) 
0.471* 
(<.0001) 
0.754* 
(<.0001) 
0.644* 
(<.0001) 
0.431* 
(<.0001) 
0.470* 
(<.0001) 
0.729* 
(<.0001) 
0.672* 
(<.0001) 
HPI -0.0001* 
(<.0001) 
-0.0004* 
(<.0001) 
-0.000 
(0.814) 
0.0001* 
(<.0001) 
-0.0002* 
(<.0001) 
-0.0003* 
(<.0001) 
-0.0001* 
(0.005) 
0.0001* 
(<.0001) 
Income per capita 0.001* 
(0.021) 
0.004* 
(<.0001) 
0.006* 
(<.0001) 
0.001 
(0.256) 
0.002* 
(<.0001) 
0.004* 
(<.0001) 
0.009* 
(<.0001) 
0.002* 
(0.010) 
Unemployment rate 0.083* 
(0.023) 
-0.346* 
(<.0001) 
-0.199* 
(0.009) 
0.37774* 
(<.0001) 
0.055 
(0.14) 
-0.432* 
(<.0001) 
-0.042 
(0.557) 
0.449* 
(<.0001) 
Federal charter 0.001 
(0.459) 
-0.001 
(0.558) 
-0.003 
(0.186) 
-0.005* 
(0.025) 
0.001 
(0.311) 
-0.0002 
(0.934) 
-0.004** 
(0.056) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
Number of branches   -0.005* 
(<.0001) 
0.001 
(0.534) 
  -0.006* 
(<.0001) 
0.0006 
(0.623) 
* is significant at 5% level   ** is significant at 10% level  
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Table 4.8: Tobit regression for XE scores of 4th quartile of non-metro credit unions 
 Estimates for 4th quartile (without OBS) Estimates for 4th quartile (with OBS) 
Parameter 1994-1998 1999-2001 2002-2007 2008-2012 1994-1998 1999-2001 2002-2007 2008-2012 
Intercept 0.399* 
(<.0001) 
-0.476* 
(<.0001) 
-0.408* 
(<.0001) 
1.492* 
(<.0001) 
0.355* 
(<.0001) 
-0.380* 
(<.0001) 
-0.28321* 
(<.0001) 
1.435* 
(<.0001) 
Total assets 0.023* 
(<.0001) 
0.072* 
(<.0001) 
0.070* 
(<.0001) 
-0.010* 
(0.010) 
0.021* 
(<.0001) 
0.064* 
(<.0001) 
0.05871* 
(<.0001) 
-0.007** 
(0.068) 
Total membership -0.011* 
(<.0001) 
-0.015* 
(0.0001) 
-0.012* 
(0.001) 
-0.059* 
(<.0001) 
-0.006* 
(0.0258) 
-0.014* 
(0.001) 
-0.00527 
(0.1697) 
-0.061* 
(<.0001) 
Profitability -1.249* 
(<.0001) 
-0.977* 
(<.0001) 
-1.356* 
(<.0001) 
-0.267* 
(0.024) 
-1.177* 
(<.0001) 
-0.437* 
(0.007) 
-1.10223* 
(<.0001) 
-0.176 
(0.153) 
Delinquency 0.768* 
(<.0001) 
0.582* 
(<.0001) 
0.119 
(0.327) 
-0.041 
(0.675) 
0.6071* 
(<.0001) 
0.140 
(0.361) 
-0.168 
(0.197) 
-0.071 
(0.489) 
Intermediation activity -0.675* 
(<.0001) 
-0.957* 
(<.0001) 
-1.057* 
(<.0001) 
-1.038* 
(<.0001) 
-0.682* 
(<.0001) 
-0.887* 
(<.0001) 
-1.085* 
(<.0001) 
-1.065* 
(<.0001) 
Capital adequacy 0.413* 
(<.0001) 
0.291* 
(<.0001) 
-0.103* 
(0.010) 
0.172* 
(0.0006) 
0.337* 
(<.0001) 
0.244* 
(<.0001) 
-0.295* 
(<.0001) 
0.083 
(0.1151) 
Deposit activity 0.555* 
(<.0001) 
0.620* 
(<.0001) 
0.617* 
(<.0001) 
0.783* 
(<.0001) 
0.592* 
(<.0001) 
0.612* 
(<.0001) 
0.655* 
(<.0001) 
0.8257* 
(<.0001) 
HPI -0.0004* 
(<.0001) 
-0.0003* 
(<.0001) 
-0.0002* 
(<.0001) 
0.0002* 
(<.0001) 
-0.001* 
(<.0001) 
-0.0004* 
(<.0001) 
-0.0003* 
(<.0001) 
0.0002* 
(<.0001) 
Income per capita 0.002* 
(<.0001) 
0.005* 
(<.0001) 
0.003* 
(0.0001) 
-0.003* 
(<.0001) 
0.005* 
(<.0001) 
0.008* 
(<.0001) 
0.006* 
(<.0001) 
-0.002* 
(0.0152) 
Unemployment rate -0.122* 
(0.009) 
-0.514* 
(<.0001) 
0.715* 
(<.0001) 
0.470* 
(<.0001) 
-0.185* 
(0.0001) 
-0.963* 
(<.0001) 
0.562* 
(<.0001) 
0.527* 
(<.0001) 
Federal charter 0.003* 
(0.050) 
0.002 
(0.451) 
0.001 
(0.514) 
0.002 
(0.424) 
0.005* 
(0.013) 
0.003 
(0.313) 
0.001 
(0.569) 
0.003 
(0.2896) 
Number of branches   0.0004** 
(0.086) 
0.004* 
(<.0001) 
  -0.001* 
(0.002) 
0.004* 
(<.0001) 
* is significant at 5% level   ** is significant at 10% level  
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Table 4.9: Tobit regression for XE scores of 1st quartile of metro credit unions 
 Estimates for 1st quartile (without OBS) Estimates for 1st quartile (with OBS) 
Parameter 1994-1998 1999-2001 2002-2007 2008-2012 1994-1998 1999-2001 2002-2007 2008-2012 
Intercept 0.370* 
(<.0001) 
-0.400* 
(<.0001) 
0.028 
(0.672) 
-0.657* 
(<.0001) 
0.346* 
(<.0001) 
-0.490* 
(<.0001) 
-0.056 
(0.406) 
-0.708* 
(<.0001) 
Total assets 0.049* 
(<.0001) 
0.056* 
(<.0001) 
0.048* 
(<.0001) 
0.058* 
(<.0001) 
0.051* 
(<.0001) 
0.063* 
(<.0001) 
0.053* 
(<.0001) 
0.066* 
(<.0001) 
Total membership 0.008* 
(0.019) 
0.012* 
(0.033) 
-0.007 
(0.210) 
-0.014* 
(0.045) 
0.009* 
(0.011) 
0.012* 
(0.033) 
-0.005 
(0.333) 
-0.017* 
(0.024) 
Profitability -0.743* 
(<.0001) 
-0.154 
(0.360) 
-0.419* 
(0.002) 
0.010 
(0.92) 
-0.702* 
(<.0001) 
0.025 
(0.889) 
-0.234** 
(0.083) 
0.089 
(0.371) 
Delinquency 0.186* 
(<.0001) 
0.073 
(0.123) 
0.052 
(0.154) 
0.088 
(0.134) 
0.183* 
(<.0001) 
0.062 
(0.221) 
0.059 
(0.117) 
0.096 
(0.120) 
Intermediation activity -0.373* 
(<.0001) 
-0.068* 
(0.022) 
-0.575* 
(<.0001) 
0.074 
(0.553) 
-0.349* 
(<.0001) 
-0.06941* 
(0.029) 
-0.604* 
(<.0001) 
0.120 
(0.150) 
Capital adequacy 0.507* 
(<.0001) 
0.726* 
(<.0001) 
0.210* 
(0.001) 
0.953* 
(<.0001) 
0.522* 
(<.0001) 
0.700* 
(<.0001) 
0.176* 
(0.008) 
0.985* 
(<.0001) 
Deposit activity 0.414* 
(<.0001) 
0.140* 
(<.0001) 
0.481* 
(<.0001) 
0.048 
(0.631) 
0.397* 
(<.0001) 
0.143* 
(<.0001) 
0.511* 
(<.0001) 
0.018 
(0.7829) 
HPI -0.003* 
(<.0001) 
-0.0003** 
(0.060) 
-0.001* 
(<.0001) 
-0.000 
(0.110) 
-0.003* 
(<.0001) 
-0.0002 
(0.216) 
-0.001* 
(<.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.158) 
Income per capita -0.005* 
(0.0004) 
0.004** 
(0.091) 
0.007* 
(0.001) 
0.016* 
(<.0001) 
-0.006* 
(0.0002) 
0.004 
(0.151) 
0.008* 
(0.0003) 
0.014* 
(<.0001) 
Unemployment rate -0.053 
(0.374) 
0.0473 
(0.736) 
0.968* 
(<.0001) 
-0.056 
(0.6272) 
-0.095 
(0.128) 
-0.066 
(0.657) 
0.661* 
(<.0001) 
-0.038 
(0.749) 
Federal charter -0.004 
(0.192) 
-0.001 
(0.770) 
0.0003 
(0.955) 
-0.036* 
(<.0001) 
-0.006** 
(0.082) 
-0.004 
(0.415) 
-0.012* 
(0.009) 
-0.048* 
(<.0001) 
Number of branches   -0.048* 
(<.0001) 
0.008 
(0.3598) 
  -0.041* 
(<.0001) 
0.009 
(0.366) 
* is significant at 5% level   ** is significant at 10% level  
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Table 4.10: Tobit regression for XE scores of 2nd quartile of metro credit unions 
 Estimates for 2nd quartile (without OBS) Estimates for 2nd quartile (with OBS) 
Parameter 1994-1998 1999-2001 2002-2007 2008-2012 1994-1998 1999-2001 2002-2007 2008-2012 
Intercept 0.365* 
(<.0001) 
0.481* 
(<.0001) 
-0.591* 
(<.0001) 
-0.129 
(0.323) 
0.344* 
(<.0001) 
0.443* 
(0.001) 
-0.353* 
(0.001) 
-0.008 
(0.955) 
Total assets 0.039* 
(<.0001) 
0.002 
(0.746) 
0.068* 
(<.0001) 
0.061* 
(<.0001) 
0.039* 
(<.0001) 
0.006 
(0.433) 
0.053* 
(<.0001) 
0.050* 
(<.0001) 
Total membership -0.024* 
(<.0001) 
-0.03268* 
(<.0001) 
-0.036* 
(<.0001) 
-0.051* 
(<.0001) 
-0.022* 
(<.0001) 
-0.031* 
(0.001) 
-0.028* 
(<.0001) 
-0.040* 
(<.0001) 
Profitability -0.853* 
(<.0001) 
-0.207 
(0.227) 
-0.670* 
(<.0001) 
-0.318* 
(0.0047) 
-0.598* 
(<.0001) 
-0.006 
(0.974) 
-0.548* 
(0.001) 
-0.293* 
(0.014) 
Delinquency 0.422* 
(<.0001) 
0.300* 
(0.002) 
0.339* 
(0.0005) 
-0.120 
(0.349) 
0.253* 
(0.0002) 
0.102 
(0.327) 
0.126 
(0.226) 
-0.189 
(0.161) 
Intermediation activity -0.553* 
(<.0001) 
-0.007 
(0.952) 
0.040 
(0.693) 
-0.234 
(0.107) 
-0.569* 
(<.0001) 
-0.031 
(0.791) 
-0.0714 
(0.507) 
-0.263** 
(0.085) 
Capital adequacy 0.375* 
(<.0001) 
0.769* 
(<.0001) 
0.698* 
(<.0001) 
0.688* 
(<.0001) 
0.337* 
(<.0001) 
0.702* 
(0.001) 
0.551* 
(<.0001) 
0.650* 
(<.0001) 
Deposit activity 0.654* 
(<.0001) 
0.232* 
(0.011) 
0.138 
(0.102) 
0.209* 
(0.019) 
0.657* 
(<.0001) 
0.237* 
(0.014) 
0.209* 
(0.019) 
0.310* 
(0.016) 
HPI -0.002* 
(<.0001) 
0.00004 
(0.748) 
-0.0004* 
(<.0001) 
0.000 
(0.819) 
-0.002* 
(<.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.689) 
-0.0004* 
(<.0001) 
0.000 
(0.186) 
Income per capita 0.003* 
(0.007) 
0.010* 
(<.0001) 
0.017* 
(<.0001) 
0.005* 
(0.012) 
0.004* 
(0.001) 
0.010* 
(0.001) 
0.018* 
(<.0001) 
0.005* 
(0.012) 
Unemployment rate -0.016 
(0.810) 
-0.065 
(0.586) 
0.741* 
(<.0001) 
0.122 
(0.140) 
-0.069 
(0.321) 
-0.007 
(0.954) 
0.656* 
(<.0001) 
0.074 
(0.396) 
Federal charter 0.0004 
(0.891) 
0.002 
(0.656) 
0.003 
(0.437) 
-0.002 
(0.712) 
-0.004 
(0.128) 
-0.001 
(0.805) 
-0.002 
(0.547) 
-0.004 
(0.443) 
Number of branches   -0.013* 
(0.0004) 
0.002 
(0.687) 
  -0.007** 
(0.081) 
-0.001 
(0.849) 
* is significant at 5% level   ** is significant at 10% level  
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Table 4.11: Tobit regression for XE scores of 3rd quartile of metro credit unions 
 Estimates for 3rd  quartile (without OBS) Estimates for 3rd quartile (with OBS) 
Parameter 1994-1998 1999-2001 2002-2007 2008-2012 1994-1998 1999-2001 2002-2007 2008-2012 
Intercept 0.089 
(0.139) 
-0.408* 
(0.0001) 
-0.537* 
(0.0001) 
0.993* 
(<.0001) 
0.075 
(0.241) 
-0.525* 
(0.0001) 
-0.484* 
(<.0001) 
1.013* 
(<.0001) 
Total assets 0.042* 
(<.0001) 
0.072* 
(0.0001) 
0.074* 
(0.0001) 
0.0004 
(0.951) 
0.042* 
(<.0001) 
0.077* 
(0.0001) 
0.071* 
(<.0001) 
-0.001 
(0.852) 
Total membership -0.019* 
(<.0001) 
-0.036* 
(0.0001) 
-0.028* 
(0.0001) 
-0.047* 
(<.0001) 
-0.016* 
(<.0001) 
-0.036* 
(0.0001) 
-0.032* 
(<.0001) 
-0.049* 
(<.0001) 
Profitability -0.558* 
(0.0001) 
0.107 
(0.511) 
-0.869* 
(0.0001) 
-0.036 
(0.859) 
-0.457* 
(0.003) 
0.181 
(0.289) 
-0.583* 
(0.0004) 
0.035 
(0.869) 
Delinquency 0.168** 
(0.063) 
0.302* 
(0.021) 
0.383* 
(0.0001) 
0.057 
(0.667) 
0.068 
(0.483) 
0.342* 
(0.013) 
0.289* 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.990) 
Intermediation activity -0.101 
(0.227) 
-0.012 
(0.911) 
-0.392* 
(0.0001) 
-0.550* 
(<.0001) 
-0.140 
(0.116) 
0.003 
(0.981) 
-0.500* 
(<.0001) 
-0.622* 
(<.0001) 
Capital adequacy 0.743* 
(<.0001) 
0.729* 
(0.0001) 
0.392* 
(0.0001) 
0.542* 
(<.0001) 
0.686* 
(<.0001) 
0.738* 
(0.0001) 
0.296* 
(<.0001) 
0.441* 
(<.0001) 
Deposit activity 0.272* 
(0.0001) 
0.243* 
(0.001) 
0.482* 
(0.0001) 
0.617* 
(<.0001) 
0.304* 
(<.0001) 
0.230* 
(0.020) 
0.573* 
(<.0001) 
0.673* 
(<.0001) 
HPI -0.0005* 
(0.004) 
0.0001 
(0.201) 
-0.0005* 
(0.0001) 
-0.000 
(0.333) 
-0.001* 
(<.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.168) 
-0.0005* 
(<.0001) 
-0.0002) 
Income per capita 0.003* 
(0.015) 
0.002 
(0.111) 
0.0134* 
(0.0001) 
0.004* 
(0.013) 
0.005* 
(<.0001) 
0.003* 
(0.029) 
0.016* 
(<.0001) 
0.006* 
(0.0002) 
Unemployment rate 0.033 
(0.463) 
0.009 
(0.909) 
0.284* 
(0.001) 
-0.149* 
(0.011) 
-0.042 
(0.367) 
0.016 
(0.851) 
0.181* 
(0.034) 
-0.178* 
(0.005) 
Federal charter -0.001 
(0.769) 
-0.004 
(0.120) 
0.003 
(0.284) 
0.002 
(0.665) 
0.001 
(0.670) 
-0.003 
(0.246) 
0.004 
(0.138) 
0.004 
(0.286) 
Number of branches   -0.008* 
(0.0001) 
-0.005* 
(0.004) 
  -0.007* 
(<.0001) 
-0.005* 
(0.004) 
* is significant at 5% level   ** is significant at 10% level  
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Table 4.12: Tobit regression for XE scores of 4th quartile of metro credit unions 
 Estimates for 4th quartile (without OBS) Estimates for 4th quartile (with OBS) 
Parameter 1994-1998 1999-2001 2002-2007 2008-2012 1994-1998 1999-2001 2002-2007 2008-2012 
Intercept 0.479* 
(<.0001) 
0.527* 
(<.0001) 
0.502* 
(<.0001) 
0.481* 
(<.0001) 
0.461* 
(<.0001) 
0.527* 
(<.0001) 
0.466* 
(<.0001) 
0.335* 
(0.0002) 
Total assets 0.025* 
(<.0001) 
0.019* 
(0.0003) 
0.013* 
(0.0108) 
0.049* 
(<.0001) 
0.024* 
(<.0001) 
0.019* 
(0.0004) 
0.014* 
(0.011) 
0.057* 
(<.0001) 
Total membership -0.013* 
(<.0001) 
-0.018* 
(0.0012) 
-0.011** 
(0.053) 
-0.071* 
(<.0001) 
-0.009* 
(0.007) 
-0.019* 
(0.0007) 
-0.012* 
(0.047) 
-0.075* 
(<.0001) 
Profitability -1.050* 
(<.0001) 
-0.933* 
(<.0001) 
-1.200* 
(<.0001) 
-0.483** 
(0.052) 
-1.086* 
(<.0001) 
-0.739* 
(0.0001) 
-1.141* 
(<.0001) 
-0.409 
(0.122) 
Delinquency 0.612* 
(<.0001) 
0.986* 
(<.0001) 
0.053 
(0.733) 
-0.064 
(0.733) 
0.404* 
(0.001) 
0.940* 
(<.0001) 
-0.092 
(0.578) 
-0.091 
(0.648) 
Intermediation 
activity 
-0.768* 
(<.0001) 
-0.928* 
(<.0001) 
-1.019* 
(<.0001) 
-0.932* 
(<.0001) 
-0.768* 
(<.0001) 
-0.950* 
(<.0001) 
-1.080* 
(<.0001) 
-0.917* 
(<.0001) 
Capital adequacy 0.305* 
(<.0001) 
0.185* 
(0.003) 
0.170* 
(0.002) 
0.122 
(0.182) 
0.236* 
(<.0001) 
0.172* 
(0.009) 
0.049 
(0.409) 
0.064 
(0.5125) 
Deposit activity 0.817* 
(<.0001) 
0.835* 
(<.0001) 
0.810* 
(<.0001) 
0.883* 
(<.0001) 
0.837* 
(<.0001) 
0.858* 
(<.0001) 
0.864* 
(<.0001) 
0.870* 
(<.0001) 
HPI -0.001* 
(<.0001) 
0.0002* 
(0.047) 
-0.0002* 
(<.0001) 
0.000** 
(0.0561) 
-0.001* 
(<.0001) 
0.0001** 
(0.070) 
-0.0003* 
(<.0001) 
0.000* 
(0.001) 
Income per capita 0.002* 
(0.0085) 
0.006* 
(<.0001) 
0.012* 
(<.0001) 
-0.001 
(0.532) 
0.004* 
(<.0001) 
0.006* 
(<.0001) 
0.0153* 
(<.0001) 
0.001 
(0.573) 
Unemployment rate -0.155* 
(<.0001) 
-0.113* 
(0.048) 
0.391* 
(<.0001) 
0.129* 
(0.035) 
-0.189* 
(<.0001) 
-0.157* 
(0.007) 
0.382* 
(<.0001) 
0.090 
(0.170) 
Federal charter 0.002 
(0.374) 
-0.003 
(0.268) 
0.004 
(0.110) 
-0.002 
(0.576) 
0.003** 
(0.063) 
-0.002 
(0.415) 
0.007* 
(0.012) 
-0.002 
(0.719) 
Number of 
branches 
  0.001* 
(<.0001) 
0.003* 
(<.0001) 
  0.001* 
(<.0001) 
0.003* 
(<.0001) 
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2008-12 (p>0.35). For the second quartile impact was insignificant in 1999-01 (p=.23) and 
significantly negative for other periods (p<.0048). Impact on XE scores was negative for the fourth 
quartile of metro credit unions throughout the study period (p<.052). With the increase in 
profitability, the XE scores generally decreased for credit unions and the impact was insignificant 
for the lower quartiles of credit unions during the recovery period. Cyree and Spurlin (2012) also 
observed a trade-off between the efficiency and profitability of rural community banks. Turati 
(2001) observed a tendency among inefficient banks to convert their higher costs to higher prices 
of services they offer to consumers in order to continue with positive profitability. For credit unions 
aiming more profit, might have to do it at the expense of higher cost ratio.  
 Delinquency ratio: Bauer, Miles and Nishikawa (2009) termed the delinquency ratio as 
measure of “asset quality.” For the first, second, and third quartiles of non-metro credit unions, the 
effect of the delinquency ratio on the XE score was positively significant (p<.021) (See Tables 4.5 
to 4.12). After a continuous increase over the periods (1994-2007) the effect started decreasing 
during the recovery period from 2008-2012. For the fourth quartile group, the magnitude of the 
coefficient diminished over the periods (1994-2012) and was not significant for the periods after 
the recession in 2002 (p>0.32). For the first quartile of metro credit unions, the delinquency ratio 
had a significant positive (p<.0001) impact on XE scores during 1994-1998 time frame, The 
remaining time periods were not significant.  For the second and third quartiles, the effect was 
significantly (p<.064) positive during 1994-2007 and was not significant during recovery period 
of 2008-2012. For the fourth quartile of metro credit unions, the effect was significant (p<.0001) 
before the economic recessions and was not significant during subsequent economic recessions 
and recovery periods. The effect of delinquent loans on the XE score was positive for the lower 
quartiles of non-metro credit unions and started decreasing during the recovery period. For the 
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upper quartile of non-metro credit unions and all metro credit unions, the influence of delinquent 
loan on the XE score was not significant during the economic recovery process.    
 Intermediation activity:  For the first quartile category of non-metro credit unions, the 
effect of intermediation activity (the ratio of total loans to total assets) on the XE scores was mixed 
– significantly (p<.002) positive during the periods 1994-1998 and 2008-2012, and negative 
(p<.002) during 1999-2007 (See Tables 4.5 to 4.12). The opportunity of adding more members 
after the 1998 membership act, the impulse to cope up with the economic recession in 2002 might 
have led the non-metro credit unions to restructure the loan portfolio, which might have increased 
the costs of services for this lower asset band group.  For the all other quartiles of non-metro credit 
unions, the effect of total loans on XE scores was negative (p<.0003) throughout the remaining 
study periods. The first quartile group of metro credit unions, the impact of total loans on the XE 
scores was negative (p<.023) during 1994-2007, and was not significant during the economic 
recovery period from 2008-2009. For the second quartile category, the effect was also negative 
(p<.0001) during 1994-1998 while not significant for any other study periods. For the third 
quartile, the effect was not significant before recession in 2002, and became negative (p<.0002) 
during the economic recovery process. For the fourth quartile of metro credit unions, the impact 
was negative (p<.0001) throughout all study periods. The lower quartiles of non-metro credit 
unions started increasing XE scores during the economic recovery period by providing more loans. 
This observation contrasts with the remaining non-metro credit unions, for which effect of loans 
was significantly negative (p<.0003). For the lower quartiles of metro credit unions, the amount 
of loans had no significant impact on XE scores during the economic recovery process. During the 
same time periods, however, the amount of loans had a significant negative (p<.0002) impact on 
XE scores for the upper quartiles of metro credit unions.  
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Capital adequacy: An increased amount of member equity helped non-metro and metro 
credit unions improve XE scores significantly (p<.0034) for all quartiles throughout the study 
period, except for the fourth quartile of non-metro credit unions during 2002-2007, in which the 
impact was significantly (p<.001) negative (See Tables 4.5 to 4.12). The lower quartiles of credit 
unions managed to perform better in XE measures during the economic recovery process through 
increased members’ equity, but credit unions in the upper quartiles performed lower during 
economic recovery in comparison with periods before the economic recessions.  
Deposit activity: An increase in the ratio of total loans to total deposits helped non-metro 
credit unions to improve XE scores throughout the study period (See Tables 4.5 to 4.12). The 
contribution of deposit activities was lower for the lower quartiles of non-metro credit unions 
during economic recovery periods in comparison with periods before the economic recessions. 
However, the upper quartiles of non-metro credit unions managed to gain more in XE scores during 
economic recovery periods in comparison with periods before economic recessions through an 
increase in deposit activity. Increasing deposit activity helped metro credit unions to improve XE 
scores throughout the entire study period, with the exception of the first quartile group during 
2008-2012, and the second quartile during 2002-2007. The upper quartiles of credit unions 
experienced more gain in XE scores with the increase in loans to deposits ratio than lower quartile 
credit unions during economic recovery time periods.  
   House price index: For the first quartile of non-metro credit unions, the impact of house 
price on XE scores was significantly negative (p<.0001) during 1994-1998 and 2002-2007, and 
was not significant during 1999-2001 and 2008-2012 (See Tables 4.5 to 4.12). For the second 
quartile, the impact was significantly negative (p<.0001) during 1994-1998 and 2002-2007, the 
results were not significant during 1999-2001, significantly positive (p<.0001) during 1994-2001, 
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insignificant from 2002-2007, and significantly positive (p<.0001) from 2008-2012. For the fourth 
quartile, the impact was negative (p<.0001) during 1999-2007, and positive in 2008-2012 
(p<.0001). For the first quartile of metro credit unions, the effect of house price on XE scores was 
significantly negative (p<.06) during 1994-2007 while not being significant from 2008-2012. For 
the second and third quartiles, the impact was significantly negative (p<.0043) in 1994-1998 and 
2002-2007, no significant results were present during 1999-2001 or 2008-2012. For the fourth 
quartile, the impact was significantly negative (p<.0001) during 1994-1998 and 2002-2007. 
Significantly positive impacts were observed (p<.06) during the periods 1999-2001 and 2008-
2012. However the effect of an increase in house price was negative or not significant for non-
metro credit unions before the financial crisis in 2008-2009, the upper quartiles of non-metro credit 
unions benefited from the increase in house price during the economic recovery period during the 
period 2008-2012. The first three quartiles of metro credit unions experienced no significant 
impact of house price increase on XE scores, but the fourth quartile of metro credit unions have 
gained in XE score with the increase in housing expense during 2008-2012.  
Per capita income: For the first quartile of non-metro credit unions, the impact of income 
on XE was significantly positive (p<.0062) during 1999-2012; for the second quartile significantly 
positive (p<.025) during 1994-2012; for the third quartile significantly positive (p<.021) during 
1994-2007, and insignificant during 2008-2012; and for the fourth quartile significantly positive 
(p<.0002) during 1994-2007, and significantly negative (p<.0001) during 2008-2012. For the first 
quartile of metro credit unions, the impact of income on XE was significantly positive (p<.092) 
during 1999-2012, and negatively significant (p<.0005) during 1994-1998; for the second quartile 
significantly positive  (p<.012) during 1994-2012; for the third quartile significantly positive 
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(p<.015) during 1994-1998 and 2002-2012, and insignificant during 1999-2001; and for the fourth 
quartile significantly positive (p<.0086) during 1994-2007, and insignificant during 2008-2012. 
Unemployment rate: The effect of an increase in the unemployment rate on XE scores was 
negative (p<.012) for the first quartile of non-metro credit unions and the third quartile of metro 
credit unions during the economic recovery in 2008-12 (See Tables 4.5 to 4.12). For the same 
period, the effect was positive (p<.0001) for the upper quartiles of non-metro credit unions, no 
significant results were present for the first and second quartiles of metro credit unions, while  
positive relationships were evident for the fourth quartile group of metro credit unions. 
Credit union charter type: The first quartile of federally chartered non-metro credit unions 
performed lower (p<.076) than state chartered credit unions in 1994-1998 and 2002-2007 (See 
Tables 4.5 to 4.12). The second quartile of federally chartered non-metro credit unions performed 
higher (p=0.02) than state chartered credit unions in 1999-2001, but performed lower (p=.0003) 
during 2008-2012. The third quartile of federally chartered non-metro credit unions also performed 
lower than state chartered credit unions in 2008-2012. The fourth quartile of federally chartered 
non-metro credit unions performed higher  (p=0.0496) than state chartered credit unions in 1994-
1998. The first quartile of federally chartered metro credit unions performed (p<.0001) lower than 
state chartered credit unions during 2008-2012. For the second, third, and fourth quartiles of metro 
credit unions performance was not dependent on charter type. During the economic recovery 
period, charter type significantly explained differences (p<.025) in performance for the first three 
quartiles of non-metro credit unions and the first quartile of metro credit unions, and the 
performance of state chartered credit unions was always higher than that of federally chartered 
credit unions.  
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Number of branches: The percentages of the non-metro credit unions with more than one 
branches ranged between 1.4% - 9.15%, 7.3% - 15.5%, 22.1% - 52.4% and 69.7% - 90% 
throughout the study periods for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th quartiles respectively. For the first three 
quartiles of non-metro credit unions numbers of branches were only significant during 2002-2007, 
having a positive impact on XE scores for the second quartile and having a negative impact on XE 
scores for the first and third quartiles (See Tables 4.5 to 4.12). Branch numbers had a positively 
significant (p<.087) impact on XE scores for the fourth quartile of credit unions during 2002-2012. 
The percentages of the metro credit unions with more than one branches ranged between 2% - 
9.2%, 13% - 33.5%, 44.6% - 71.5% and 86.6% - 96.1% throughout the study periods for the 1st, 
2nd, 3rd and 4th quartiles respectively. For the first and second quartiles of metro credit unions the 
number of branches had a significantly (p<.0005) negative impact on XE scores during 2002-2007. 
For the third quartile the impact was significantly (p<.0036) negative during the periods from 
2002-2012. For the fourth quartile the impact was significantly (p<.0001) positive during the 
extended time period from 2002-2012. In general, only the upper quartiles of non-metro and metro 
credit unions had significant (p<.0001) improvement in XE scores associated with an increased 
number of branches during the economic recovery from 2008-2012.  
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS 
 After deregulation (1998), X-efficiency scores of the 1st quartile of non-metro credit unions 
increased compared to earlier time periods. The lower two quartiles (1st and 2nd) also increased 
growth in efficiency scores after the recession in 2002. However upper quartile groups (2nd, 3rd 
and 4th) of non-metro credit unions did not benefit from deregulation. Credit unions in upper two 
quartiles (3rd and 4th) experienced decrease in managerial performance measures of cost 
controlling after the recession in 2002. All quartiles of metro credit unions failed to gain from 
deregulation, though the third quartile achieved a slight improvement in efficiency scores. The 
lower quartiles of metro credit unions managed to improve performance after the recession in 
2002. In general, the opportunity to add one or more fields of membership was beneficial to the 
lower quartile groups of non-metro credit unions and to some upper quartile metro credit unions. 
All other credit unions could not take advantage of the opportunity of deregulation with respect to 
X-efficiency scores. They could not control the costs of operation after the opportunity of adding 
more members was open to them. 
 By utilizing off-balance sheet activities, the lowest quartile of non-metro credit unions did 
not gain significant benefits before and after the deregulation. However, before and after the 
deregulation, all other non-metro credit unions increased efficiency scores throughout the study 
periods; they also managed to improve performances by increasing off-balance sheet items during 
the economic downturns. The lowest quartile of metro credit unions didn’t show significant 
improvement by added off-balance sheet activities before and after the derregulation; however, 
they improved performance during the economic downturn through off-balance sheet items was 
evident. For the upper quartiles of metro credit unions the contribution of off-balance sheet items 
was mixed among different asset size categories. In general, off-balance sheet activities improved 
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efficiency scores for all types of credit unions. All credit unions learned to survive financial 
upheavals by increasing off-balance-sheet activities.  
 An increase in total assets improves the managerial performance of all quartiles of credit 
unions. However, during the recovery period, the upper quartile groups of credit unions faced 
decrease in the measurement of managerial performance in cost controlling. An increase in the 
total number of members had a significant negative (p<.053) impact on overall X-efficiency 
scores. Delinquency ratio always had a positive impact (when statistically significant) on the X-
efficiency scores of credit unions; so, delayed earnings from repayment by the borrowers didn’t 
increase the cost of collection for credit unions, or for the credit unions with higher delinquency 
ratio, the cost management was better by them. Nevertheless, the lower quartiles of non-metro 
credit unions have gained in efficiency scores during economic recovery period after the financial 
crisis. Greater member equity helped all metro and non-metro credit unions increase efficiency 
scores except for the 4th quartile of metro credit unions; they are unaffected by the increase in 
member equity. The upper quartiles of credit unions gain more in efficiency scores with increases 
in deposits than do lower quartiles. The upper quartiles of non-metro and metro credit unions gain 
in efficiency scores with increases in housing price. Per capita income has a significant (p<.092) 
positive impact on all credit unions’ performance. An increase in the unemployment rate appears 
to reduce efficiency scores for the lower quartiles of non-metro credit unions more than any other 
type of credit union. Charter type appears to have a significant (p<.083) impact on the 
performances of the first three quartiles of non-metro credit unions and the first quartile of metro 
credit unions. During the economic recovery period, credit unions with lower asset size performed 
better if operating under a state charter.  
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 This study was limited by the fact that DEA efficiency score is a relative efficiency index 
(Xue and Harker, 1999). It is possible for future researchers to improve on the efficiency 
measurement technique by using more recently developed measurement methods e.g. 
bootstrapping or double bootstrapping method. Further researches on the performances of non-
metro credit unions are possible. It would be an interesting notion to observe on the ability of lower 
asset band non-metro credit unions in managing the opportunity offered by more members. 
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